United States v. Jones and Starr, ARMY MISC 20250182, 20250182

Sergeant First Class (SFC) Bryan D. Starr was charged in a military court for involuntary manslaughter, child endangerment, and negligent homicide following the death of his girlfriend's five-year-old son, after he had already pleaded guilty and been sentenced for manslaughter in civilian court.
The convening authority initially referred charges to a general court-martial and later dismissed them due to procedural concerns, after which the Office of Special Trial Counsel (OSTC) exercised its statutory authority and preferred new charges, again referring Starr to a general court-martial despite recommendations against referral.
After defense motions alleging defects in the Article 32 preliminary hearing process, the military judge repeatedly ordered that the preliminary hearing be reopened to address substantive and procedural objections, including failure to provide relevant evidence and objections not being forwarded as required.
The convening authority, despite not supporting referral to trial, responded to defense objections by ordering the hearing be reopened with a different officer; OSTC reaffirmed referral, arguing exclusive authority under statutory reforms.
The government sought a writ of prohibition from the Court of Criminal Appeals to prevent the judge from returning the case to the convening authority to reopen the preliminary hearing; the court considered whether such relief was warranted under the All Writs Act.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Authority to reopen preliminary hearing	Only OSTC can control reopening for covered offenses	Both convening authority and OSTC can reopen on objections	Both may have authority; not exclusive to OSTC
Jurisdiction for writ under All Writs Act	Writ needed to prevent improper reopening, which damages trial referral authority	Rule did not strip convening authority's procedural powers; no clear impact on outcome	Writ inappropriate; not clearly in aid of jurisdiction
Adequacy of alternative relief	Writ is the only means to resolve procedural dispute	Alternative remedies exist within the government structure	Government can seek remedy through internal channels
Appropriateness of extraordinary relief	Necessary to prevent repeated, improper delays in court-martial process	Not extraordinary, as military judge correctly enforced procedural rights	Not warranted under existing circumstances

Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (2004) (writs are extraordinary and require clear right and lack of alternatives)
Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529 (1999) (All Writs Act does not expand jurisdiction)
United States v. Howell, 75 M.J. 386 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (clarifies standards for writs, jurisdiction)
Hasan v. Gross, 71 M.J. 416 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (requirements for extraordinary writs, clear and indisputable right)
United States v. Brown, 81 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (potential jurisdiction for writs in service courts)
LRM v. Kastenberg, 72 M.J. 364 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (jurisdiction to issue writs for evidentiary rulings)