383 F. Supp. 3d 810
N.D. Ill.2019Background
- Between Feb–Apr 2017 Jones and Schimenti allegedly assisted a confidential human source (CHS) whom they believed sought to travel to Syria to join ISIS by arranging travel, counseling on evading detection, and providing cell phones intended for use as improvised explosive device components.
- The CHS was an FBI confidential human source; Defendants did not know that.
- Schimenti was arrested on April 12, 2017 and, during FBI interrogation, allegedly made several false statements denying his involvement and the purpose of the phones.
- A two-count Superseding Indictment charges both Defendants with conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization (18 U.S.C. § 2339B) (Count I) and charges Schimenti with making materially false statements to FBI agents involving international terrorism (18 U.S.C. § 1001) (Count II).
- Defendants moved to dismiss Count I as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and Schimenti moved to dismiss Count II arguing immateriality and that the terrorism enhancement (8-year maximum) does not apply. The Court denied both motions.
Issues
| Issue | Government's Argument | Defendants' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2339B is void-for-vagueness as applied | § 2339B plainly proscribes providing or attempting to provide material support to an FTO; applies even where defendant deals with a purported member or facilitation network | Statute fails to give fair notice whether assisting an individual who is not yet an FTO member (e.g., CHS) is covered | Court: § 2339B is not vague as applied; indictment alleges conduct squarely within the statute |
| Whether § 2339B is facially overbroad under the First Amendment | Statute targets material support, not protected advocacy or membership; conduct here (weapons/assist to IRA) is unprotected | Statute criminalizes expressive association and advocacy because it defines FTOs broadly | Court: overbreadth challenge fails; statute targets conduct, not protected speech, and case law rejects overbreadth |
| Whether § 2339B requires defendant to be under FTO control or be an FTO member | Government: liability extends to anyone who provides individuals or items intended to work under FTO direction; no control/membership element for the defendant | Defendants: statute ambiguous as to whether provider must be under FTO direction or be a member | Court: plain text requires only that the individual provided be for the FTO’s direction/control; no requirement that defendant be controlled by FTO |
| Whether Schimenti’s alleged false statements to FBI were immaterial and outside § 1001 (and whether terrorism enhancement applies) | False statements had natural tendency to influence FBI investigation; concerned terrorism so 8‑year max applies | Statements immaterial because agents already had evidence; investigation was effectively concluded; terrorism enhancement inapplicable | Court: statements were materially capable of influencing investigation despite existing evidence; terrorism enhancement applies because statements related to ISIS and explosives |
Key Cases Cited
- Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (plain statutory language controls construction)
- Williams v. United States, 553 U.S. 285 (void‑for‑vagueness principles)
- Cook v. United States, 914 F.3d 545 (analyzing vagueness as‑applied)
- Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (§ 2339B targets material support, not protected advocacy)
- Hammadi v. United States, 737 F.3d 1043 (conviction under § 2339B where defendant dealt with CHS/facilitator)
- Turner v. United States, 551 F.3d 657 (false statement materiality: natural tendency to influence investigation)
- Dick v. United States, 744 F.2d 546 (materiality does not require actual agency reliance)
- Rahman v. United States, 805 F.3d 822 (elements of § 1001 offense)
- Wilson v. United States, 879 F.3d 795 (standard for materiality under § 1001)