United States v. Jones
748 F.3d 64
| 1st Cir. | 2014Background
- In 2011 Donald J. Jones III created a motherless.com account and posted sexually explicit material and solicitations indicating interest in sexual activity with very young girls; he communicated with an undercover postal inspector (posing as a father of an eight‑year‑old) and arranged a meeting in Rhode Island.
- Jones traveled toward Providence, carrying child‑sized lingerie and a USB drive and phone containing child pornography; agents arrested him when he exited the bus and discovered matching child‑pornography files and contact information linking him to the undercover account.
- A jury convicted Jones on six federal counts: interstate travel to engage in sexual act with a person under 12 (18 U.S.C. § 2241(c)); using the internet to persuade a minor to engage in sexual activity (18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)); interstate travel to engage in a sex act with a minor (18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)); transporting and possessing child pornography (18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1), 2252(a)(4)(B)); and committing those offenses while required to register as a sex offender (18 U.S.C. § 2260A).
- The district court admitted a certified 1993 New Jersey conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a nine‑year‑old under Federal Rule of Evidence 414; Jones was tried without moving for acquittal and was convicted on all counts.
- At sentencing the district court imposed life terms on counts 1 and 2 (plus lengthy terms on other counts), producing a total sentence of life plus ten years; the appellate court affirms convictions but vacates the life sentences on counts 1–2 and remands for resentencing on counts 1–5.
Issues
| Issue | Jones's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of prior child‑molestation conviction under Fed. R. Evid. 414 | Rule 414 requires an actual child victim; admission was unfairly prejudicial and irrelevant to pornography counts | Rule 414 permits other‑acts evidence in child‑molestation cases (including attempts/conspiracies); the prior conviction was relevant to counts 1–3 and 6 and not unduly prejudicial | Admission not plain error or abuse of discretion; judgment affirmed on evidentiary claim |
| Validity of § 2260A conviction (offense while registered sex offender) | § 2260A requires an actual minor victim; conviction invalid without real child | Circuit precedent (Slaughter) and jury instruction supported that predicate offenses need not involve an actual child for § 2260A application | No plain error; § 2260A conviction affirmed |
| Legality of life sentence under § 2241(c) enhancement | Life sentence improper because the 1993 NJ conviction does not qualify as a § 2241(c) predicate (state statute lacks intent element present in § 2241(c)) | Government concedes life terms problematic but urged remand for resentencing on remaining counts | Life sentence vacated: 1993 NJ conviction not a § 2241(c) predicate; remand for resentencing on counts 1–5 |
| Applicability of § 3559(e) (mandatory life for repeat sex offenders) | Prior state conviction does not qualify as federal § 2241(c) offense, so § 3559(e) cannot support life term | Government agreed that § 3559(e) could not sustain the life term here | § 3559(e)-based life sentence vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258 (standard for plain‑error review)
- Martinez v. Cui, 608 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2010) (Rules 413–415 supersede Rule 404(b) propensity ban in sexual‑assault/child‑molestation cases)
- United States v. Slaughter, 708 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding § 2260A does not require an actual child when predicate offense does not)
- Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1986) (risk of unfair prejudice from prior‑conviction evidence)
- United States v. Francois, 715 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2013) (vacating some sentences may require full resentencing where sentencing architecture is disrupted)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (look at statutory elements, not underlying facts, for predicate‑offense comparison)