United States v. Jones, 762 F. Supp. 2d 270

Jones was convicted after a four-day trial of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and distribution within 1000 feet of a school; he was sentenced as a career offender to 10 years in prison.
The central issue was the identification of Jones as the person who set up the drug transaction; video and photo identifications formed the backbone of the case.
Massachusetts State Trooper Patterson, undercover, conducted a drug buy using a hidden video camera; a Brockton police unit later identified a suspect from video and Patterson identified Jones from a single photo.
A second officer, Telford, identified Jones from the video, corroborating Patterson’s photo identification; Patterson’s identification procedure was challenged as suggestive.
Defense proffered Dr. Steven Penrod as an eyewitness-identification expert; the court excluded Penrod’s testimony and instructed the jury on eyewitness issues instead.
In sentencing, Jones’s status as a career offender led to a guideline range of 262–327 months, but the court varied downward to a 120-month term plus eight years of supervised release, citing local similarly situated cases and policy considerations.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of eyewitness-identification expert	Jones argues Penrod's testimony is admissible to aid jurors.	Jones contends Penrod’s testimony is necessary to counter identification flaws.	Court excluded Penrod; no expert testimony, used jury instructions instead.
Reliability and use of eyewitness identifications	Identifications by Patterson and Telford are sufficiently reliable.	Identifications are inherently unreliable due to cross-racial bias and suggestive procedure.	Court allowed eyewitness identifications but asserted caution via jury instructions on their reliability.
Impact of cross-racial identification on admissibility	Cross-racial factors can be addressed through ordinary trial process and instructions.	Cross-racial factors undermine accuracy and warrant expert testimony.	Court did not accept expert testimony but provided substantive instructions addressing cross-racial concerns.
Reasonableness of career-offender sentencing and potential departure	Career-offender guidelines should yield a lengthy sentence.	Career-offender sentence is disproportionately harsh for Jones’s role; departure/variance warranted.	Court downwardly varied from the career-offender guidelines to 120 months, citing disparity and local context.

Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (U.S. 1977) (reliability of eyewitness identification factors)
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (U.S. 1972) (factors for evaluating eyewitness identifications)
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (U.S. 1968) (due process concerns in identification)
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (U.S. 1967) (due process considerations in identification procedures)
United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 1995) (discretion on admitting eyewitness expert testimony)
United States v. Rodríguez-Berrios, 573 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2009) (case-by-case assessment of expert testimony on eyewitness identifications)
United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2006) (expert testimony admissibility when eyewitness identification key)
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1967) (factors in eyewitness identification and its reliability)