United States v. Jones, 134 F.4th 831

Cedric Ray Jones pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and using/brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, with the firearm charge based on the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
Jones's plea agreement included a broad waiver of his rights to appeal or seek collateral review of his convictions and sentences, with limited exceptions.
After the Supreme Court in United States v. Davis struck down the § 924(c) residual clause as unconstitutionally vague, Jones filed a habeas petition to vacate his § 924(c) conviction.
The district court denied Jones's motion, finding it was barred by the collateral review waiver in his plea agreement.
On appeal, Jones argued the waiver could not bar his challenge based on Davis, raising several arguments including the scope, intent, and knowing nature of his waiver, as well as miscarriage-of-justice.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding the waiver enforceable and no exceptions applied; a dissent argued circuit precedent required the waiver language to be more specific to bar Davis-type claims.

Issue	Jones's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Does broad waiver bar challenge after new precedent?	Waiver too general to include right to avoid unconstitutional conviction (Davis claim).	Waiver includes all challenges, including to unconstitutional convictions.	Waiver enforceable; general language sufficient.
Contractual intent of waiver	The plea's carve-outs indicate parties never intended waiver to bar illegal sentence challenges.	Carve-outs only refer to statutory max at time of sentencing, not later changes in law.	Exception applies only to max at sentencing, not new law.
Waiver "knowing" if right did not exist yet	Couldn’t knowingly waive a right that was not recognized at the time (Davis right).	Knowing does not mean "all-knowing"; parties assume risk of legal changes after waiver.	Waiver valid even if right recognized after plea.
Miscarriage-of-justice exception	Should recognize exception where enforcing waiver would be unjust or unconstitutional.	Circuit doesn’t recognize broad miscarriage-of-justice exception to waivers.	Court declined to recognize/apply miscarriage-of-justice exception.

United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (Supreme Court struck down § 924(c) residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
United States v. White, 258 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2001) (general waiver language does not bar challenge where indictment fails to charge a valid predicate offense; cited prominently in dissent)
United States v. Barnes, 953 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2020) (defendants can waive rights to challenge illegal/unconstitutional sentences via waiver)
United States v. Caldwell, 38 F.4th 1161 (5th Cir. 2022) (identical facts; waiver barred Davis claim)
Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (Supreme Court: guilty plea does not always waive all constitutional challenges to conviction)