United States v. Jonathan Turner
897 F.3d 1084
| 9th Cir. | 2018Background
- Turner was indicted in separate fraud schemes (2009 and 2012 indictments); both matters involved long pretrial delays, repeated continuance requests, and Turner’s frequent changes between retained/court‑appointed counsel and attempts to proceed pro se.
- 2009 case: multiple continuances (trial moved from 2010 to Sept. 25, 2012); court denied a requested long continuance to accommodate a substitute lawyer and proceeded with appointed counsel (Steward) at trial; Turner convicted October 5, 2012.
- 2012 case: indicted April 2012; Turner repeatedly vacillated about self‑representation vs. appointed counsel; after warnings and opportunities to retain counsel, the court concluded Turner waived counsel by conduct and required him to proceed pro se for the July 2013 trial; Turner convicted August 15, 2013.
- Turner sought CJA funds for psychiatric/medical evaluations (for defense/new trial and sentencing); district court denied the requests as unnecessary or untimely, finding limited probative value for post‑hoc evaluations and evidence of malingering/delay.
- District court declined to conduct a sua sponte competency hearing or grant a mistrial for the 2012 trial; it found Turner competent to proceed and to represent himself based on court observations and medical reports; this appeal challenges those rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of a longer continuance in 2009 (which led to loss of chosen counsel) violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice | Turner: denial effectively deprived him of counsel of choice because substitute counsel withdrew when the court would not continue until late Nov/Dec 2012 | Government/Court: short continuance was reasonable given prior lengthy delays, prosecutor’s schedule, and court calendar | Denial affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion under continuance factors (inconvenience, prior continuances, defendant‑caused delay, lack of prejudice) |
| Whether Turner validly waived his right to counsel in 2012 (court required him to proceed pro se) | Turner: waiver invalid; he did not knowingly/intelligently relinquish right to counsel and had requested counsel repeatedly | Government/Court: Turner repeatedly vacillated, used tactics to delay, refused multiple competent appointed attorneys after warnings — waiver by conduct | Waiver affirmed: record shows knowing/intelligent waiver by conduct; court permissibly found manipulative delays and warned Turner before finding waiver |
| Whether district court abused discretion by denying CJA funds for psychiatric/mental evaluation (2009 & 2012) | Turner: independent psychiatric evaluation was necessary for diminished‑capacity/new‑trial and for mitigation at sentencing | Government/Court: proposed evaluations were minimally probative of mental state at time of offenses years earlier; reports and PSR provided sufficient mitigation info; some requests were untimely | Denial affirmed: no abuse of discretion—lack of clear, non‑speculative need and no clear prejudice from absence of evaluation |
| Whether court plainly erred by failing to hold sua sponte competency hearing, grant mistrial, or terminate self‑representation in 2012 | Turner: his physical/mental complaints, episodes of apparent confusion and drowsiness created genuine doubt about competency and ability to self‑represent | Government/Court: medical records, MDC reports, and courtroom behavior showed competency; many complaints found to be malingering/delay; Turner could coherently participate in voir dire, cross‑examination, and motions | No plain error: record does not create a reasonable judge’s genuine doubt about competence; competency and self‑representation rulings affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant has constitutional right to self‑representation if waiver of counsel is knowing and voluntary)
- Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983) (trial court may deny continuance absent unreasoning insistence on expeditiousness when denial is arbitrary)
- McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (limits on standby counsel’s participation when defendant proceeds pro se)
- United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2007) (waiver of counsel may result from manipulative conduct that makes competent representation impossible)
- United States v. Thompson, 587 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2009) (continuance analysis factors where continuance implicates right to counsel)
- United States v. Kelm, 827 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1987) (consider entire record when assessing knowing and intelligent waiver to proceed pro se)
- Ayestas v. Davis, 138 S. Ct. 1080 (2018) (consider usefulness of requested investigative/expert services in light of potential merit of claims under related statutes)
- United States v. Rodriguez‑Lara, 421 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2005) (CJA expert‑funding standard: whether reasonably competent counsel would have required the expert and whether defendant was prejudiced)