United States v. Jonathan Thomas
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413
9th Cir.2013Background
- In Feb 2010 Border Patrol Agent LeBlanc and his drug-detection dog Beny‑A alerted to Jonathan Thomas’s pickup at an interior checkpoint; Beny‑A put paws and nose on the toolbox but was not allowed to complete his trained sit‑indication. A subsequent search of the locked toolbox by agents (using Thomas’s keys) uncovered ~150 lbs of marijuana.
- Thomas was indicted (Mar 2010) for possession with intent to distribute; a superseding indictment (May 2011) added a conspiracy count. The district court dismissed the original possession count under the Speedy Trial Act but kept the conspiracy count, treating the superseder as triggering a new 70‑day clock.
- Thomas moved to suppress the marijuana, challenging (1) the dog’s contact with the toolbox as a Fourth Amendment search under Jones/Jardines, (2) sufficiency of disclosed K‑9 training/performance records (heavily redacted), and (3) that Beny‑A’s incomplete indication could not support probable cause. The district court denied suppression; Thomas was convicted on the conspiracy count and appealed.
- On appeal the Ninth Circuit addressed (a) whether a superseding indictment that adds counts not required to be joined restarts the Speedy Trial Act 70‑day clock, and (b) multiple Fourth Amendment and discovery issues relating to the K‑9 encounter and materials.
- The court held the conspiracy charge was timely because a superseding indictment that adds charges not required to be joined starts a new 70‑day clock; but the court found the government’s redaction of K‑9 records violated Rule 16/Cedano‑Arellano and was not harmless, requiring vacatur and remand for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Thomas's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a superseding indictment that adds a new charge restarts the Speedy Trial Act 70‑day clock | Superseding indictment does not restart the 70‑day clock; only reindictment after dismissal does | A superseding indictment that charges offenses not required to be joined starts a new 70‑day clock | Held: New 70‑day clock applies to superseding counts not required to be joined (Speedy Trial Act compliance affirmed for conspiracy count) |
| Whether directing the dog to touch the toolbox was a Fourth Amendment search requiring suppression (Jones/Jardines) | Touching was a trespass/search under Jones/Jardines and should trigger suppression | Even if touching implicated the Fourth Amendment, officers acted in reasonable reliance on then‑binding precedent (Caballes/Place) so exclusionary rule should not apply | Held: The conduct was not suppressed under exclusionary‑rule principles because officers reasonably relied on existing precedent; no automatic suppression on that ground |
| Whether the government’s heavy redaction of K‑9 training/performance records violated discovery obligations under Rule 16 / Cedano‑Arellano | Redactions prevented meaningful challenge to dog reliability; full records required | Government relied on sensitivity/law‑enforcement concerns and argued materiality inapplicable because Thomas contested duress not guilt | Held: Redactions violated precedent (Cedano‑Arellano and Harris); error not harmless; conviction vacated and case remanded for in‑camera review / further disclosure or new trial |
| Whether Beny‑A’s incomplete indication (no final sit) could not establish probable cause | A final trained indication is required; untrained behaviors are insufficient as a matter of law | A totality‑of‑the‑circumstances approach governs; intermediate alert behaviors by a reliable dog/handler can establish probable cause | Held: No bright‑line rule requiring a completed sit; probable cause may rest on observed alert behavior and handler testimony under the totality of circumstances (Harris affirmed this flexible approach) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (Jones reintroduced trespass/physical‑intrusion inquiry alongside Katz expectation‑of‑privacy test)
- Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (use of a drug dog on the front porch to investigate the home constituted a search under Jones)
- Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (exclusionary rule inapplicable where officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding precedent)
- Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (a dog sniff during a lawful traffic stop that reveals only the presence of contraband does not violate the Fourth Amendment)
- Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013) (totality‑of‑the‑circumstances approach to canine reliability; defendants must be permitted to challenge dog reliability)
- United States v. Cedano‑Arellano, 332 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2003) (government must disclose handler logs, training records, certifications and score sheets when dog alerts are used to justify searches)
- United States v. Alford, 142 F.3d 825 (5th Cir. 1998) (a superseding indictment charging new offenses may commence a new speedy‑trial period)