971 F.3d 806
8th Cir.2020Background
- At ~1:45 a.m. on Jan. 21, 2018, Milbank, SD Officer Morgan stopped Figueroa‑Serrano for an unlit license plate; Morgan smelled burnt marijuana, observed red eyes, and learned the driver’s license had been canceled.
- A search of the car revealed burnt marijuana, containers of concentrated marijuana wax (state felony), a pipe and other paraphernalia in a gym bag behind the driver’s seat.
- Deputy Leusink located a Sig Sauer 9mm in a bag behind the front passenger seat; officers seized the gun without a warrant and arrested Figueroa‑Serrano.
- In the squad car (before Miranda) Figueroa‑Serrano admitted having an e‑cig pen and recent marijuana use; later at the jail (after warnings were given and re‑stated) he made further statements including about immigration status; and on Feb. 22 he spoke by phone with a DHS agent after receiving Miranda warnings.
- He was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) (noncitizen unlawfully present possessing a firearm) and conditionally pleaded guilty while preserving appeal of the district court’s denial of his suppression motion.
- The magistrate recommended suppression, but the district court denied suppression; the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Figueroa‑Serrano's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the warrantless seizure of the gun could be justified by the plain‑view doctrine | Seizure invalid because officers lacked probable cause that the gun was connected to a federal offense; no evidence he was a regular/temporal user of drugs under § 922(g)(3) | Probable cause existed: smell of marijuana, red eyes, burned cigarette, concentrated wax (felony), and paraphernalia created a fair probability the gun was linked to unlawful drug use | Gun seizure valid under plain‑view: officers had probable cause to associate the gun with unlawful drug use; seizure affirmed |
| Whether three pre‑Miranda statements in the squad car should be suppressed | All three custodial, unwarned responses must be excluded | Government conceded one response (wax) should be suppressed but maintained the others were admissible | District court erred to admit unwarned statements, but error was harmless because those statements concerned marijuana use (not immigration or the gun) and independent evidence was overwhelming |
| Whether Figueroa‑Serrano validly waived Miranda before jail interrogation by Morgan & Leusink | Waiver invalid: warnings were speed‑recited, he had recently used marijuana, and a one‑hour gap undermined understanding | Waiver valid: warnings given, he said he understood, no coercion or deception, conversational setting, timely coherent answers | Waiver was knowing and voluntary; statements at the jail admissible |
| Whether Figueroa‑Serrano validly waived Miranda for the Feb. 22 DHS phone call | Waiver involuntary/coerced because a guard summoned him and stood nearby; unsure he could refuse | Waiver valid: agent read Miranda, asked if he understood and had questions, he affirmed and answered; guard’s presence alone not coercive | Waiver knowing and voluntary; phone statements admissible |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Lewis, 864 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2017) (defines when incriminating character is "immediately apparent" for plain‑view seizure)
- United States v. Vinson, 805 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2015) (sets plain‑view elements for warrantless seizures)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (probable cause is a "fair probability" standard)
- United States v. Turnbull, 349 F.3d 558 (8th Cir. 2003) (requires temporal nexus between gun possession and regular drug use under § 922(g)(3))
- United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2001) (state officers may seize evidence of exclusively federal offenses under plain‑view)
- Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (Miranda warnings required before custodial interrogation; failure generally requires exclusion)
- Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (defines "interrogation" as words or actions reasonably likely to elicit incriminating response)
- Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (two‑part test for voluntariness and knowing, intelligent waiver)
- Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (government bears preponderance burden to prove valid Miranda waiver)
- United States v. Vinton, 631 F.3d 476 (8th Cir. 2011) (apply totality of circumstances to evaluate Miranda waiver)