United States v. Jon Christopher Stoune
694 F. App'x 688
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Over ~5 weeks Stoune (posing as “Mycroft Holmes”) exchanged sexually explicit online texts and images with someone he believed was a 14‑year‑old girl; the interlocutor was actually Sgt. Gazdick, an undercover police officer.
- Stoune sent genital photos/videos, described BDSM and dominance fantasies, acknowledged knowledge of the minor’s age, and requested to meet in person.
- Police arrested Stoune at the arranged meeting; he had extensive BDSM paraphernalia and later admitted he came to meet a 14‑year‑old but claimed role‑playing and no intent to have sex.
- Trial evidence included the undercover chats, Gazdick’s testimony about the sting and his training/experience, and Stoune’s post‑arrest statements.
- At trial, Gazdick testified on redirect that criminals give false names to avoid detection; defense objected. During rebuttal, the prosecutor asked a rhetorical question referencing “the child”; court sustained an objection and told prosecutor to move on.
- Jury convicted Stoune of attempted enticement (18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)), advertising/producing visual depictions involving a minor (18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)), and attempted production of child pornography (18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecutor's rhetorical remark during rebuttal required a curative instruction or deprived Stoune of a fair trial | Prosecutor’s reference to “child” in rebuttal improperly suggested statutory rape and prejudiced the jury | Remark was a brief response to defense intent argument, jury knew undercover was adult, and court instructed jury to consider only evidence | No reversible error; remark not sufficiently prejudicial and overwhelming evidence of guilt; district court’s general jury instruction sufficient |
| Whether permitting Gazdick to opine why online subjects give false names violated Rule 701 and required expert qualification | Gazdick’s testimony was expert speculation beyond lay witness scope and prejudicial (showed consciousness of guilt) | Gazdick had particularized experience in online undercover investigations; lay opinion on giving false names is rationally based and helpful | No clear abuse of discretion; testimony admissible under Rule 701 as experience‑based lay opinion; any error harmless given evidence of intent |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2014) (standard for reviewing prosecutorial misconduct)
- United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938 (11th Cir. 2006) (prejudice standard for prosecutorial remarks)
- United States v. Hernandez, 145 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1998) (evaluate prosecutor's statements in context of whole trial)
- United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1985) (prosecutorial error harmless where not pervasive)
- United States v. Alanis, 611 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1980) (similar standard on pervasive prosecutorial misconduct)
- United States v. Jacoby, 955 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1992) (jury instruction “only evidence” can rectify some prosecutorial errors)
- United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2011) (standard of review for evidentiary rulings and Rule 701 discussion)
- United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2005) (harmless‑error analysis for evidentiary rulings)
- Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., 320 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2003) (lay opinion testimony permitted based on particularized experience)