United States v. Johnson
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 21339
7th Cir.2017Background
- Police observed an SUV stopped ~7–8 feet from a crosswalk in Milwaukee, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.53 (stopping closer than 15 feet). Motor was running; driver had gone into a store.
- Two police cars pulled up—one parallel, one behind—at night; officers shone lights into the vehicle and approached.
- Officers saw a rear-seat passenger (Randy Johnson) make furtive movements; Officer Conway ordered him out; a gun on the floor was then observed and Johnson (a felon) was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- Johnson moved to suppress the gun; the district court denied the motion; a Seventh Circuit panel affirmed but the full court reheard en banc.
- The majority held the approach and brief seizure were lawful because police had probable cause to cite the parking violation and need not resolve statutory exceptions before approaching; dissent argued the seizure was unreasonable and that Terry/Whren should not extend to routine parking infractions.
Issues
| Issue | Johnson's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers could approach/briefly seize occupants to issue a ticket for a suspected parking violation | Police should have observed long enough to determine statutory exception (loading/unloading) before approaching; immediate seizure unreasonable | Probable cause (car within 15 ft) allowed approach and brief seizure; courts can resolve defenses later | Held for government: probable cause justified approach/seizure; officers need not resolve exceptions first |
| Whether Whren objective-probable-cause rule applies to parked/parking violations | Whren should not be extended to parking infractions; doctrine for moving-vehicle stops differs | Whren and its core doctrines (objective standard; probable cause suffices) apply to parked as well as moving vehicles | Held for government: Whren applies to parking violations and parked vehicles |
| Whether the manner of the stop (two cruisers, spotlights, doors opened, occupants ordered out/handcuffed) made the seizure unreasonable | Tactics were excessively intrusive for a parking infraction; the seizure violated Terry reasonableness balancing | The presence of two cars/spotlights did not change result: driver absent, car not going anywhere, ticketing entails brief seizure | Held: district court’s factual finding that manner did not produce the gun is not clearly erroneous; affirmed (majority did not reach excessiveness issue) |
| Whether the loading/unloading statutory proviso prevented any reasonable basis to stop/seize without further observation | The proviso makes many short stops lawful; officers lacked reasonable basis in the few seconds they acted | Officers had probable cause for violation and could approach; judicial process can assess proviso as a defense | Held for government: proviso does not bar approach; probable cause sufficed to initiate seizure |
Key Cases Cited
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (objective probable-cause standard allows pretextual traffic stops)
- Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (officer may order driver out after a traffic stop)
- Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) (officers may arrest on probable cause even if a defense may later apply)
- Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (officers may arrest for minor offenses)
- Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) (self-protective steps officers may take during traffic stops)
- United States v. Thornton, 197 F.3d 241 (7th Cir. 1999) (approaching a parked car in violation of parking regulation can be reasonable)
- United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 2015) (assumed Whren extends to parked vehicles)
- United States v. Paniagua-Garcia, 813 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2016) (limits on stops based on reasonable suspicion principles)
- United States v. Flores, 798 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2015) (reversing stops predicated on an unreasonable theory that covered substantial lawful conduct)