United States v. Johnson, 786 F.3d 241

In 2006 Johnson pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (≈6 grams) under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), an offense then carrying a 40‑year maximum and classified as a Class B felony; he was ultimately sentenced in 2008 to 61 months and five years’ supervised release.
The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) raised the cocaine‑base quantity threshold that triggered the 40‑year statutory maximum (from 5g to 28g), which reclassified many prior § 841 offenses from Class B to Class C for offenses committed after the FSA.
While on supervised release in 2014, Johnson was convicted in Connecticut of first‑degree assault; the district court found that violated his supervised release and revoked it.
The district court imposed the statutory maximum for a Class B felony supervised‑release revocation (three years under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)), rather than the two‑year maximum for a Class C felony.
Johnson appealed, arguing the FSA’s post‑enactment reclassification should govern the maximum penalty on revocation because the revocation occurred after the FSA’s effective date.
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding the applicable revocation penalties are determined by the law in effect at the time of the underlying offense and that Dorsey does not extend FSA relief to supervised‑release revocations that execute a previously imposed pre‑FSA sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether FSA reclassification applies to revocation penalty	Johnson: FSA reclassification should reduce revocation statutory maximum to two years because revocation occurred after FSA	Government: Penalties for supervised‑release violations are fixed by law at time of underlying offense; revocation is execution of original sentence	Revocation penalties are determined by law at time of underlying offense; FSA does not reduce revocation penalty here
Whether Dorsey requires applying FSA to defendants convicted pre‑FSA but sentenced post‑FSA in revocation context	Johnson: Dorsey applies because revocation is a later sentencing event	Government: Dorsey applied to initial sentencing, not to execution of pre‑existing supervised‑release terms; revocation is part of original sentence	Dorsey is inapplicable to revocations that execute an original pre‑FSA sentence

United States v. Ortiz, 779 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2015) (penalties on supervised‑release violations determined by law at time of underlying offense)
Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (FSA applies to offenders who committed pre‑Act crimes but were sentenced after the FSA took effect)
United States v. Turlington, 696 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2012) (FSA does not alter revocation penalties for defendants convicted and sentenced pre‑FSA)
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) (revocation sanctions are part of the original sentence; double jeopardy not implicated)
United States v. Amer, 110 F.3d 873 (2d Cir. 1997) (supervised release and initial imprisonment form a single sentence; revocation executes the original sentence)
United States v. Pettus, 303 F.3d 480 (2d Cir. 2002) (revocation is not a new punishment but part of original sentence)