United States v. Johnson
314 F. Supp. 3d 248
D.C. Cir.2018Background
- Defendant Jimmy Lee Johnson, Jr. charged in April 2018 with being a felon in possession of a firearm; relevant arrest captured on at least one MPD body-worn camera (≈12 hours of footage).
- Government moved for a protective order requiring immediate production of footage to defense but restricting use, disclosure, copying, and retention (redaction duties placed on defense counsel; use limited to this case; return/destroy on dismissal/acquittal).
- Defense opposed: argued the government should review and redact before production; sought broader use (other cases), sharing within the Federal Public Defender (FPD) office, showing to witnesses without prior court permission, and indefinite retention.
- Court held a hearing and applied Rule 16(d)(1)'s good-cause standard for protective orders, emphasizing the default that the government ordinarily reviews discovery before producing it.
- Court rejected the proposed order insofar as it shifted redaction responsibility to defense counsel, limited use to this case, and required destruction/return after dismissal/acquittal; it permitted sharing within the FPD and use in other cases, but barred public disclosure to unrelated third parties.
- Court directed the parties to submit a revised protective order: government to redact before production; defense may use footage in other matters and share within FPD; may show to persons aiding defense; may retain footage indefinitely; cannot disclose to unrelated non‑judicial persons.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Johnson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Who must review and redact body-worn camera footage before disclosure? | Government proposed immediate production of unredacted footage and required defense to redact before use. | Defense argued government must review and redact first; shifting burden to defense is improper and inefficient. | Court: Government must review/redact before production; government bears burden to show good cause to deviate from Rule 16 default. |
| May defense use the footage in other cases or proceedings? | Government sought to limit use to this case (and appeals/postconviction) due to sensitivity/volume. | Defense argued footage may be used in other cases, especially involving same officers. | Court: Use may extend to other cases; government did not show good cause to limit use to this case. |
| May defense share footage with colleagues in FPD or with potential witnesses without prior court approval? | Government limited disclosure to a narrow "legal defense team" and required court authorization for other disclosures. | Defense sought ability to discuss/share with FPD colleagues and to show to witnesses during investigation without court permission. | Court: Defense may share within FPD and show to persons reasonably necessary for defense preparation without prior court approval; public disclosure barred. |
| Must defense return/destroy footage after dismissal or acquittal? | Government required return/destruction, analogizing to sensitive medical records. | Defense sought indefinite retention for litigation and related matters. | Court: Defense may retain footage indefinitely; government failed to justify mandatory return/destruction. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Cordova, 806 F.3d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (good-cause standard for Rule 16(d) protective orders and factors to consider)
- United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2007) (broad, unsubstantiated harm allegations insufficient to show good cause)
- Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1986) (protective orders used to expedite discovery flow in cases with much sensitive information)
- Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (U.S. 1969) (courts may place defendants and counsel under enforceable orders against unwarranted disclosure)
- United States v. Bulger, 283 F.R.D. 46 (D. Mass. 2012) (discussion of umbrella protective orders and need for threshold good-cause showing)
- United States v. Jones, 612 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1979) (limitations on pretrial disclosure of identity/statements of government witnesses)