United States v. John Norris
698 F. App'x 849
8th Cir.2017Background
- John Lee Norris pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1349) and one count of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341); initially sentenced to 108 months and ~ $1 million restitution; sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing.
- At a March 11, 2014 pretrial hearing, Norris elected to proceed pro se after a thorough Faretta colloquy by the magistrate judge; standby counsel Anita Burns was appointed.
- At the May 28, 2014 change-of-plea hearing the district court again confirmed Norris understood his right to counsel and the dangers of self-representation; Norris waived appeal rights except for limited claims.
- On appeal Burns represented Norris; the government moved to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing (to cure any plea-agreement breach), which this Court granted.
- Before resentencing Norris filed a pro se request for counsel and asked the court to appoint someone other than Burns (arguing Burns was “compromised” and counsel paid by the federal government could not represent him). The district court denied the request, warned again about self-representation, and resentenced Norris while he proceeded pro se.
- Norris appealed, arguing the district court should have conducted a renewed Faretta inquiry at resentencing and that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a renewed Faretta colloquy was required at resentencing after intervening events (representation on appeal; request for new counsel) | Norris: changed circumstances (appeal with counsel; request for different counsel) reintroduced doubt and required further inquiry | Government/District Court: prior thorough Faretta colloquy plus reiteration at resentencing made waiver knowing and voluntary; request for a different counsel did not erase prior waiver | Court held no renewed colloquy required; Norris validly waived right to counsel at resentencing |
| Whether denial of appointment of new (non-federal-paid) counsel coerced Norris into an unconstitutional Hobson’s choice | Norris: denial forced choice between inadequate counsel and self; coerced waiver | Govt: court provided real alternative of self-representation vs adequate counsel; defendant’s refusal to accept appointed counsel constituted choice to proceed pro se | Court held no Hobson’s choice; alternative was real and waiver was voluntary |
| Whether prior representation on appeal altered the waiver analysis | Norris: being represented on appeal shows changed circumstances undermining prior waiver | Govt: prior warnings and resentencing warnings show Norris still understood risks | Court held appellate representation did not negate the earlier, valid waiver |
| Whether the plea-appeal waiver bars this Sixth Amendment claim (alternative issue) | Norris: raised Sixth Amendment claim despite appeal waiver | Govt: argued waiver might preclude review; also urged plain-error review | Court did not decide waiver issue because waiver found valid; rejected merits of other arguments |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (recognizes Sixth Amendment right to self-representation)
- United States v. Armstrong, 554 F.3d 1159 (8th Cir. 2009) (waiver must be voluntary, knowing, intelligent; court may rely on whole record)
- United States v. Miller, 728 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2013) (review of district court permitting pro se is de novo; prior colloquy can suffice)
- United States v. Washington, 596 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2010) (no constitutional problem where defendant has real choice between counsel and self-representation)
- United States v. Conklin, 835 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. 2016) (refusal to choose between appointed counsel and self-representation can be treated as choice to proceed pro se)
- United States v. Hantzis, 625 F.3d 575 (9th Cir. 2010) (a prior Faretta colloquy need not be renewed unless circumstances change substantially)
- United States v. Vann, 776 F.3d 746 (10th Cir. 2015) (brief warning at sentencing can suffice when prior thorough colloquy exists)
- United States v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2004) (no plain error in not redoing colloquy at sentencing where defendant had waived right at trial)