43 F.4th 771
7th Cir.2022Background
- Johnson, previously federally convicted and on supervised release, agreed to cooperate with Decatur, Illinois police regarding 2014 cocaine sales; cooperation required court permission under his supervised-release conditions.
- Probation officer Gwen Powell informed AUSAs Bohm and Miller; both replied they had “no objection,” and Judge Baker authorized Johnson to cooperate; no federal non-prosecution agreement was requested or executed.
- Johnson signed a written Confidential Informant Agreement with the Decatur PD stating he had no immunity from prosecution; he claims he signed without reading and was told he would receive federal immunity.
- Later federal indictments charged Johnson for the 2014 drug transactions; he moved to dismiss arguing he had been promised federal immunity and separately moved to dismiss as a discovery/Brady sanction for allegedly withheld emails/texts.
- The district court held evidentiary hearings, found no federal non-prosecution agreement, concluded Powell and Jones lacked authority to bind the U.S. Attorney’s Office, denied both motions, and Johnson pleaded guilty reserving appeal; the district court sentenced him to 180 months.
Issues
| Issue | Johnson's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson was promised federal non-prosecution/immunity as part of the cooperation agreement | Decatur officers and Powell told him he would not be prosecuted federally; he reasonably relied on that promise | No federal AUSAs authorized transactional immunity; emails show only permission to cooperate with state authorities; probation/state officers cannot bind U.S. Attorney | No federal agreement; no actual, apparent, or inherent authority to bind federal prosecutors; district court's factual findings affirmed |
| Whether the Government committed a Brady violation or discovery abuse by late/partial disclosure of emails/texts | Late production and failure to produce U.S. Attorney’s copies deprived defense of effective use and warranted dismissal as sanction | Emails were produced before relevant hearings; contents were not favorable to defendant; no suppression or materiality under Brady | No Brady violation; evidence was available in time and was not materially favorable; denial of dismissal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Fuzer, 18 F.3d 517 (7th Cir. 1994) (only federal prosecutors can grant informal federal immunity)
- United States v. Lilly, 810 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2016) (state or agency promises of federal immunity unenforceable absent federal authority; fundamental-fairness exception is narrow)
- United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2000) (informal grants of immunity are the prerogative of U.S. Attorneys)
- Staten v. Neal, 880 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1989) (federal government not bound by agreements made solely with state agents)
- Urso v. United States, 72 F.3d 59 (7th Cir. 1995) (unauthorized acts of persons not agents do not bind the government)
- United States v. Long, 511 F.2d 878 (7th Cir. 1975) (government not bound by acts of non-agents)
- United States v. Cahill, 920 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1990) (dismissal warranted where prosecution follows on testimony taken after promise of immunity by federal prosecutor)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose favorable, material evidence)
- Turner v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1885 (2017) (Brady materiality standard: reasonable probability of a different outcome)
