United States v. John Chambers, 638 F. App'x 437

Police responded to a 911 call reporting a shooting at an apartment complex and arrived about 1–3 minutes later.
Officers observed two men walking near the complex entrance; one (Collins) had a bandana/mask covering his face and the other was John Chambers.
Officers stopped both men at gunpoint; when asked if he was armed Chambers said he had a gun; a frisk produced a loaded .40-caliber handgun (owner: Chambers’s girlfriend).
Chambers, a convicted felon, was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); he moved to suppress the firearm as the product of an unconstitutional stop/frisk.
District court denied suppression after an evidentiary hearing; jury convicted; at sentencing court applied a two-level USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) enhancement for possession of a stolen firearm.
Chambers appealed denial of suppression and the stolen-firearm enhancement; the Sixth Circuit affirmed both rulings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop and frisk Chambers after responding to the shooting	Chambers: mere presence near the scene and being with another person is insufficient; mask and proximity alone do not create particularized suspicion	Government: close temporal/physical proximity to an active shooting in a high-crime area, presence with a masked individual, and officers’ safety concerns together supplied reasonable suspicion	Court: Affirmed — the factors, viewed together under the totality of circumstances, gave reasonable suspicion to briefly detain and ask about weapons, justifying the stop and ensuing frisk after Chambers admitted he had a gun.
Whether the firearm qualified as "stolen" for a two-level Sentencing Guidelines enhancement	Chambers: no evidence the gun was "stolen" because owner did not report it stolen and there was no proof of intent to permanently deprive	Government: owner was deprived of possession without consent (gun taken from locked storage without permission), satisfying the Guidelines' definition of stolen	Court: Affirmed — under binding precedent the enhancement applies where the owner was deprived of possession without consent; intent to permanently deprive is not required.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes stop-and-frisk Fourth Amendment framework)
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) (officer may conduct investigatory stop if lawful at inception and frisk if officer reasonably suspects person is armed and dangerous)
United States v. McMullin, 739 F.3d 943 (6th Cir. 2014) (presence near a recently reported crime can support reasonable suspicion; frisk reasonable given officer safety concerns)
United States v. Jackson, 401 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2005) (interpreting “stolen” in USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) to mean deprivation of possession without consent; intent to permanently deprive not required)
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (Fourth Amendment analysis allows reasonable mistakes by officers in rapidly developing situations)