United States v. Jim Loveland, 825 F.3d 555

Loveland was tried with 11 others for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine; indictment did not charge him with possession-with-intent directly.
Government evidence showed Sanchez’s group imported and wholesaled methamphetamine; Loveland made 12–20 cash-on-delivery purchases of two ounces (two 1‑ounce bags) each, paying $2,400 per delivery.
Co‑defendants testified that quantities and purchase patterns supported inference Loveland resold the drugs; some buyers got credit or had explicit resale agreements, but Loveland always paid cash immediately and received no credit or special terms.
The jury convicted Loveland of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more; the district court sentenced him to life under mandatory sentencing enhancements for prior drug felonies.
Loveland moved for judgment of acquittal arguing insufficient evidence of an agreement to resell; the Ninth Circuit reviewed sufficiency de novo.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether evidence supported conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute (i.e., existence of an agreement between Sanchez group and Loveland to redistribute)	Repeated large‑quantity, cash purchases from the same supplier and witness testimony that Loveland resold support an inference of a tacit agreement to redistribute	Purchases were ordinary buyer–seller transactions: cash on delivery, no credit/consignment, no seller assistance or control over resale, so no agreement to redistribute	Reversed: evidence insufficient. Knowledge that a buyer probably resold and repeated sales do not prove the required agreement; buyer–seller relationship absent indicia of a shared stake does not establish conspiracy

United States v. Lennick, 18 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding proof of an agreement to redistribute is required beyond knowledge that a buyer will resell)
United States v. Mincoff, 574 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2009) (extension of credit/"fronting" can support inference of a shared stake and conspiracy)
United States v. Ramirez, 714 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2013) (reiterating that repeated sales and large quantities alone do not prove agreement to redistribute)
United States v. Moe, 781 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2015) (holistic, fact‑intensive inquiry with non‑exhaustive factors to distinguish buyer–seller from conspiracy)
United States v. Webster, 623 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing elements of conspiracy and buyer–seller distinction)
United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) (conspiracy’s essence is agreement; liability limited to scope of agreement)
Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943) (discussing indicia of control and pressure in sales contexts)
United States v. Brock, 789 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2015) (seller’s lack of interest in buyer’s downstream conduct negates inference of agreement)
United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 2008) (regular purchases on standard terms do not transform a customer into a co‑conspirator)