United States v. Jesse Pawlak
822 F.3d 902
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- Jesse Pawlak pleaded guilty to four counts of possession of a firearm/ammunition by a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) after four undercover sales; sentencing relied on U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1.
- The district court treated Pawlak as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) because one prior conviction was Ohio third-degree burglary (previously held a "crime of violence" under the residual clause).
- The Guidelines base offense level increased from 22 to 26 based on the career-offender classification; additional enhancements produced a 105-month sentence after a downward variance.
- Pawlak appealed, arguing (1) the Guidelines’ residual clause in § 4B1.2(a) is unconstitutionally vague post-Johnson, and (2) the § 2K2.1(b)(5) four-level trafficking enhancement was improperly applied because he lacked reason to believe the buyer was unlawfully entitled to possess firearms.
- The Sixth Circuit considered whether Johnson’s invalidation of the ACCA residual clause extends to the identically worded Guidelines residual clause and whether the trafficking enhancement was supported by the evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague post-Johnson | Johnson’s reasoning applies equally to the Guidelines’ identical residual clause; Guidelines are the functional framework for sentencing so vagueness doctrine applies | Guidelines are advisory, not statutes fixing sentences, so they are immune from void-for-vagueness challenges | The residual clause of § 4B1.2(a) is unconstitutionally vague; Pawlak’s sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing |
| Whether the § 2K2.1(b)(5) four-level trafficking enhancement was warranted (knowledge or reason to believe recipient’s possession would be unlawful) | Circumstantial evidence (surreptitious sales, quantity, inflated price, buyer’s "dash for it" remark) gave Pawlak reason to believe the recipient could not lawfully possess firearms | Enhancement improper because government did not prove recipient actually was prohibited from possession | The enhancement was properly applied; court found by a preponderance that Pawlak had reason to believe the buyer’s possession would be unlawful (affirmed) |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013) (Guidelines function as the anchoring framework for sentencing; subject to constitutional challenge)
- Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) (Guidelines and commentary treated like agency rules; subject to constitutional limits)
- Madrid v. United States, 805 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2015) (held Guidelines’ residual clause void for vagueness post-Johnson)
- Matchett v. United States, 802 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2015) (reached opposite conclusion; Guidelines not susceptible to vagueness challenge)
- Coleman v. United States, 655 F.3d 480 (6th Cir. 2011) (held Ohio third-degree burglary qualified as a violent felony under the residual clause)
- Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (void-for-vagueness principles regarding notice and arbitrary enforcement)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (district courts must begin sentencing analysis with the Guidelines)
- Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upheld constitutional validity of the Sentencing Guidelines)