United States v. Jermayne Whyte
928 F.3d 1317
11th Cir.2019Background
- A.E., a 16-year-old runaway from California, came to Florida and lived with Jermayne Whyte and Jennifer Castro for about two months; Whyte and Castro obtained a false ID for her, placed ads on Backpage, drove her to strip clubs, managed clients via a "trick phone," and collected her money.
- Law enforcement located A.E. while she was working; after initial reluctance she identified Whyte and Castro; police executed a search warrant at the defendants’ townhome and seized corroborating evidence (clothing, trick phone, rental receipts, phone records, cell-site data).
- A federal grand jury charged Whyte and Castro with conspiracy and sex trafficking of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), (c), 1594(c), and 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a) (transportation for prostitution).
- At trial the government relied on § 1591(c)’s language that, if a defendant had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim, the government need not prove the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the victim’s age; the district court excluded a mistake-of-age defense and so instructed the jury; the jury convicted both defendants.
- Defendants’ post-trial challenges included a Franks suppression claim (omission of A.E.’s criminal history from the warrant affidavit), alleged jury-instruction errors, a Confrontation Clause challenge to limits on cross-examination, and sentencing objections to several Guidelines enhancements and denial of acceptance-of-responsibility reductions.
Issues
| Issue | Government's Position | Defendants' Position | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) permits conviction by proof only that the defendant had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim rather than proof of knowledge or reckless disregard of age | §1591(c) unambiguously allows the government to substitute proof of a reasonable opportunity to observe for proof of knowledge or reckless disregard of age | §1591 requires proof of knowledge or reckless disregard of the victim’s age; mistake-of-age defense applies | Affirmed: §1591(c) supplies an independent basis; proof of reasonable opportunity to observe relieves government of proving knowledge or reckless disregard of age. |
| Jury instructions: omission/alleged failure to define willfulness and to list the ‘‘commercial sex act’’ element | Instructions adequately explained willfulness (pattern instruction) and the sex-act element was conveyed elsewhere in the charge and indictment | Omission of element(s) was plain error that deprived defendants of fair trial | No plain error; instructions read as a whole and indictment in jury room cured any omission. |
| Motion to suppress (Franks): whether omission of A.E.’s criminal history from affidavit was deliberate/reckless and material | Affiant’s omission was not deliberate or recklessly made to mislead; no Franks violation | Omission was deliberate/reckless and undermined probable cause | Denied: defendants failed to show deliberate or reckless omission or meet Franks burden; claim abandoned for inadequate briefing. |
| Limitation on cross-examination (Confrontation Clause): questioning about whether A.E. lied at probation hearing to avoid punishment | Limitation was within district court’s broad discretion; defense had ample opportunity to probe bias and motive | Exclusion prevented effective impeachment and violated Confrontation Clause | No violation: district court allowed extensive impeachment on bias/motive and excluded only a cumulative question; no significant impact on credibility. |
| Sentencing: application of enhancements (undue influence, computer use, sex-act) and denial of acceptance-of-responsibility; substantive reasonableness | Enhancements and denial of reduction were supported by the record; sentences within Guidelines were reasonable | Enhancements were improper (double counting, misapplication of application note) and acceptance reduction should apply; sentences substantively unreasonable | Affirmed: court correctly applied Guidelines (followed circuit precedent on application note and double-counting), denied acceptance reduction appropriately, and imposed substantively reasonable sentences. |
Key Cases Cited
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (standards for challenging warrant affidavits)
- United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2014) (prior panel dictum on reasonable-opportunity standard)
- United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2012) (interpreting §1591(c) as substituting reasonable-opportunity proof for knowledge)
- United States v. Duong, 848 F.3d 928 (10th Cir. 2017) (applying §1591(c) framework)
- United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960 (11th Cir. 2017) (application of reasonable-opportunity standard and Guidelines discussion)
- United States v. Hill, 783 F.3d 842 (11th Cir. 2015) (rejecting application note limiting computer-enhancement application)
- X-Citement Video, Inc. v. 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (discussing mens rea as to victim’s age)
- United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) (conspiracy doesn’t require knowledge of a victim’s special status)