United States v. Jermarcus Richardson
960 F.3d 761
| 6th Cir. | 2020Background
- In 2001 Richardson pled guilty to multiple federal crack-cocaine offenses and was sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment followed by 4 years’ supervised release.
- While on supervised release he committed a violent offense (stabbing) and the district court revoked release and later imposed an 18‑month revocation sentence after his state conviction.
- The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act reduced the crack/powder disparity but initially was not retroactive; the 2018 First Step Act made those Fair Sentencing Act changes retroactive and authorized sentence‑reduction motions.
- Richardson moved under the First Step Act to reduce his revocation sentence; the district court found him eligible for consideration but denied the reduction.
- The government argued limits on appellate review under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a); Richardson appealed the denial of the reduction.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and that the district court did not err procedurally or substantively in denying relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appellate jurisdiction / scope of review | Richardson argued the appeal may proceed (implicitly under §1291) and that substantive-review principles apply to denials of First Step Act relief | Government argued appeals from sentence‑reduction orders are governed by §3742(a) which bars this appeal | Court held it has jurisdiction under §1291; §3742(a) limits claims when a new sentence is imposed but does not bar appeals from denials; assumed substantive‑reasonableness review available but rejected Richardson’s claim |
| Eligibility under First Step Act | Richardson argued he was eligible for a reduced sentence | Government did not dispute eligibility | District court (and panel) found Richardson was eligible for consideration; eligibility not contested on appeal |
| Procedural reasonableness (consideration of post‑sentencing conduct) | Richardson argued the district court ignored his post‑sentencing conduct and other mitigating matters | Government argued the record shows the court considered §3553(a) factors and counsel’s arguments | Held the record shows the district court expressly considered §3553(a) and post‑sentencing conduct; no procedural error |
| Substantive reasonableness (weight given to criminal history and violation) | Richardson argued the court over‑emphasized his criminal history/violation, making the denial substantively unreasonable | Government argued weight accorded to factors is discretionary and the violent nature of the violation justified denial | Held the district court acted within its broad discretion; no abuse of discretion in weighing facts and denying reduction |
Key Cases Cited
- Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (addressing Fair Sentencing Act timing and application)
- United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2013) (interpretation of Fair Sentencing Act retroactivity issues in this circuit)
- United States v. Bowers, 615 F.3d 715 (6th Cir. 2010) (held appeals from sentence reductions governed by §3742(a))
- United States v. Marshall, 954 F.3d 823 (6th Cir. 2020) (clarified Bowers: §1291 supplies jurisdiction; §3742 limits types of claims when a new sentence is imposed)
- Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974) (pre‑Booker view on limits of appellate review where sentence within statutory range)
- United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (recognized substantive‑reasonableness review in sentencing)
- United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018) (discussed §3553(a) factor weighting and review standard)
- Chavez‑Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959 (2018) (the record as a whole can show the court considered an argument)
- United States v. Bailey, 931 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2019) (affirming deference to district court sentencing discretion)