United States v. Jeremy Wade
962 F.3d 1004
| 7th Cir. | 2020Background
- Jeremy Wade twice pretended to be a DEA special agent (wearing a badge and holstered gun, showing a mugshot, and leaving a DEA-looking business card and handwritten note) to contact Nicole Bishop in Jan–Feb 2018.
- Bishop reported the encounters; police opened a stalking investigation and Wade was interviewed; he was evasive about his employer.
- Wade was indicted on two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 912 (the acts‑as‑such clause) for falsely impersonating a federal employee and committing an overt act in conformity with the pretense.
- The district court granted the government’s motion in limine precluding Wade from arguing his romantic motive negated culpability and refused Wade’s proposed jury instruction requiring an intent to deceive or defraud; the court instructed only the two traditional elements: false impersonation and an overt act in conformity with the pretense.
- A jury convicted Wade on both counts; he appealed, challenging the jury instructions, the in limine ruling, and the sufficiency of the evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 912 requires intent to defraud or deceive as a separate element | §912 does not require intent to defraud; intent is inherent in the acts‑as‑such element | Wade: romantic motive negates culpable state of mind; intent-to-defraud is required | Held: No separate intent-to-defraud element; acts‑as‑such (overt act intended to influence victim) suffices; omission harmless here |
| Whether the district court properly excluded evidence/argument about Wade’s romantic motive | Motive irrelevant to the elements and would encourage jury nullification | Wade: motive is legally relevant and could negate culpability | Held: Exclusion proper; motive does not negate knowledge or the acts‑as‑such element; exclusion not an abuse of discretion |
| Whether the jury instructions failed to include the scienter (knowledge) requirement | Government: scienter is inherent; instructions were adequate | Wade: failure to instruct made §912 a strict‑liability offense | Held: Failure to instruct on scienter was error per precedent but harmless because no evidence Wade lacked knowledge he was not a DEA agent |
| Sufficiency of evidence for the acts‑as‑such element | Government: badge, gun, interview about a fake suspect, mugshot, card, and handwritten note were overt acts to induce Bishop to act | Wade: his actions were indistinguishable from mere pretense or repetitions and therefore insufficient | Held: Evidence sufficient for both counts; both elements were supported by the record |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702 (U.S. 1943) (defines intent‑to‑defraud in impersonation context as causing victim to act she otherwise would not)
- United States v. Rosser, 528 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (1948 revision eliminated intent‑to‑defraud as separate element; acts‑as‑such encompasses influence on victim)
- United States v. Cord, 654 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1981) (fraudulent intent not an essential element of § 912)
- United States v. Bonin, 932 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2019) (acts‑as‑such requires overt action in pretended character to influence victim; failure to instruct on mens rea is error but may be harmless)
- United States v. Rippee, 961 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1992) (distinguishes two clauses of § 912 and defines acts‑as‑such clause)
- United States v. Hamilton, 276 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1960) (acts‑as‑such covers acting in the pretended character, not necessarily performing authorized acts)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1999) (error from omission of an element in jury instructions is subject to harmless‑error review)
- Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (U.S. 2015) (criminal statutes generally interpreted to include mens rea requirements)