United States v. Jeremy Trogdon
789 F.3d 907
8th Cir.2015Background
- In the early morning of Aug. 8, 2013, three officers in a marked car observed three men and two women loitering in a closed commercial parking lot at 2121 University Ave., Des Moines, in a high-crime area with recent shootings and narcotics/gang activity.
- A business owner had sent a no-trespass letter to the city stating a no-trespassing sign had been posted and requesting police assistance in removing trespassers.
- Officers drove back to the lot, saw the same group, and upon their squad car being noticed the group walked briskly around the building toward a berm that blocked vehicular access; one member (Trogdon) appeared to place something on the ground.
- Officer Chiodo (while in the car) recognized one group member, Cornelius Brown, as a murder suspect and gang member believed to be armed and dangerous.
- Officers exited the car; Chiodo ordered Trogdon to stop and informed him he would perform a pat-down. Trogdon attempted to flee; during the takedown he announced he had a firearm and officers recovered a handgun.
- Trogdon pleaded guilty conditionally after the district court denied his motion to suppress; he appealed arguing the stop and frisk lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Trogdon | Trogdon: officers lacked reasonable suspicion; some facts (recognition of Brown, brisk walking, placement on ground) were erroneous or post-stop | Government: totality of circumstances (late hour, high-crime area, no-trespass letter, known associate Brown, evasive movement, suspected concealment) supported reasonable suspicion | Court affirmed: considering the totality, stop was justified |
| Whether officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective pat-down for weapons | Trogdon: frisk was unwarranted because stop itself was unjustified and trespass suspicion insufficient | Government: officer safety concerns supported frisk given Brown’s known dangerousness, evasive behavior, and possible concealment | Court affirmed: reasonable suspicion that suspect was armed and dangerous justified pat-down |
| Validity of relying on no-trespass letter and trespass theory | Trogdon: letter was ambiguous (one business signed), no posted sign proved; trespass alone (esp. completed misdemeanor) insufficient to justify stop | Government: letter furnished reasonable basis to believe property was posted; trespass was ongoing and one factor among many | Court: officers reasonably could rely on the letter; even if trespass uncertain, other factors suffice |
| Effect of disputed factual findings (pace, recognition timing, vehicle placement) | Trogdon: district court clearly erred on key facts undermining reasonable suspicion | Government: testimony supports district court findings; reasonable officer could infer evasive action and association | Court: no clear error; credibility and totality support reasonable suspicion |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes stop-and-frisk standard requiring reasonable, articulable suspicion)
- United States v. McMullin, 576 F.3d 810 (8th Cir. 2009) (standard of review on suppression appeals)
- United States v. Horton, 611 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2010) (reasonable suspicion and protective pat-down principles)
- United States v. Stewart, 631 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 2011) (presence late at night in high-crime area supports reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Bailey, 417 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 2005) (attempts to conceal items can support reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Hightower, 716 F.3d 1117 (8th Cir. 2013) (evaluate frisk as of the moment protective search began; holistic analysis)
- United States v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 2008) (distinguishes when alleged trespass alone does not justify a Terry stop)
- United States v. Menard, 95 F.3d 9 (8th Cir. 1996) (officer may consider a suspect’s companion’s dangerousness when relevant)