United States v. Jeremy Mack
808 F.3d 1074
| 6th Cir. | 2015Background
- Jeremy Mack ran a criminal enterprise with coconspirator Ashley Onysko that sold heroin/cocaine and recruited female addicts to prostitute themselves for his benefit.
- Three victims testified that Mack supplied drugs (sometimes “free”), created drug debts, controlled and withheld drugs, directed prostitution ads on Backpage, transported victims, and collected proceeds.
- Victims described physical violence, threats (e.g., threats to kill or “chop a bitch up”), and severe withdrawal symptoms when denied drugs, which compelled them to engage in commercial sex acts.
- A jury convicted Mack of conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371), four counts of sex trafficking (18 U.S.C. § 1591) — including trafficking of a minor — plus drug distribution and witness tampering; district court imposed life sentences on sex‑trafficking counts.
- On appeal Mack challenged sufficiency of evidence (force/coercion and minor trafficking), denial of a suppression motion (consent to search), exclusion of victims’ prior prostitution history under Fed. R. Evid. 412, and a § 3B1.1 organizer/leader sentencing enhancement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Mack) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency — conspiracy & adult sex trafficking (counts 1, 2, 4–5) | Evidence showed agreement with Onysko and overt acts (ads, transport, direction); coercion via supply/withhold of drugs, threats, and violence supported § 1591 elements | Victims had preexisting addictions and voluntarily engaged in prostitution; free to leave; no coercion or force shown | Affirmed. Circumstantial evidence of coercion/force, control of drugs, threats, and violence supported convictions; conspiracy proved by agreement/overt acts. |
| Sufficiency — sex trafficking of a minor (count 3) | Proof defendant knew or recklessly disregarded that victim MS was a minor (text, witness suspicions) | Argued generally against coercion theory; did not contest minor element on appeal | Affirmed. For minor, coercion not required; evidence supported knowledge/reckless disregard of MS’s age. |
| Suppression — warrantless search of motel room | Officers obtained verbal consent from Onysko to search room; MB invited officers in; evidence admissible | Police report omitted consent; contended Onysko did not consent, so search was unlawful | Affirmed. District court credited officer’s testimony that Onysko voluntarily consented; finding not clearly erroneous. |
| Evidentiary exclusion — victims’ prior prostitution under Rule 412 | Prior prostitution irrelevant to consent regarding acts with Mack; Rule 412(b)(1)(B) exception limited to sexual behavior with accused | Sought to admit prior prostitution to show victims consented and negate coercion | Affirmed. Excluded evidence did not fall within Rule 412(b)(1)(B) because it was not sexual behavior with the accused and was irrelevant to coercion. |
| Sentencing — § 3B1.1 organizer/leader enhancement | Court found multiple participants (transporting victims, lookout, reporting) supporting four‑level enhancement | Challenged classification of several individuals as "participants" when they were uncharged customers | Affirmed. District court’s factual findings supported that several individuals were participants; defendant’s counsel conceded accuracy below. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Campbell, 549 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2008) (standard for sufficiency review)
- United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2004) (conspiracy elements under § 371)
- United States v. Farley, 2 F.3d 645 (6th Cir. 1993) (circumstantial evidence weight)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (procedural reasonableness of sentences)
- United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 2008) (consent supports warrantless search)
- United States v. Elbert, 561 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2009) (no coercion element required for trafficking of minors)
- United States v. Pringler, 765 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2014) (knowledge/reckless disregard as to minor in § 1591)
- United States v. Caldwell, 518 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2008) (common authority to consent to searches)
