United States v. Jeong Seon Han, 199 F. Supp. 3d 38

Defendant Jeong Seon Han, a South Korean national, served as Chief Engineer aboard the U.S.-flagged fishing vessel Pacific Breeze; he was indicted in D.C. on APPS/MARPOL-related offenses.
On July 7, 2015 the U.S. Coast Guard inspected the vessel in Pago Pago, American Samoa, confiscated crew passports, and detained crew aboard the vessel during a month-long inspection; immigration holds followed at the Coast Guard’s request.
The Coast Guard and Pacific Breeze Fisheries, LLC (PBF) executed a Security Agreement permitting the vessel’s release in exchange for a surety; the agreement required PBF to bring identified crewmembers to the D.C. area and to facilitate their cooperation.
Han was paroled into the U.S. via Significant Public Benefit Parole and transported (under PBF supervision) from American Samoa to Dulles with a layover in Hawaii; he asserts he believed he was not free to leave while in Hawaii.
The government prosecuted in D.C.; Han moved to dismiss the indictment for improper venue under 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (Venue Motion) and also moved to dismiss for failure to state an offense (denied as moot).
The district court found Han was in the functional equivalent of custody while in Hawaii, held he was “first brought” to the District of Hawaii under § 3238, granted the Venue Motion, and dismissed the D.C. indictment without prejudice (order held 10 days to permit refiling in Hawaii).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Han was “first brought” under 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (proper venue)	Government: Han was not in custody in Hawaii (he had his passport, no law-enforcement escort), so D.C. venue is proper	Han: He was functionally in custody during transit and thus was first brought to Hawaii, making venue there proper	Court: Han was in functional custody in Hawaii; § 3238’s “first brought” prong applies to Hawaii; D.C. indictment dismissed without prejudice
Appropriate test for “custody” under § 3238	Government: Use Miranda/Beheler-style objective restraint test focused on formal arrest-level restraint; Han’s situation did not meet that	Han: Use broader Fourth Amendment / reasonable-person seizure (Mendenhall) and habeas/constructive custody analogies; consider alienage/language	Court: Applied multiple frameworks (Mendenhall, Miranda, habeas/constructive custody) and found functional custody based on totality of facts
Relevance of alienage and limited English to custody analysis	Government: Such characteristics are irrelevant to whether restraint equated to custody for § 3238 venue	Han: Alienage and language barriers increase coercion and are relevant to whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave	Court: Alienage and inability to understand English are permissible and important considerations; they supported finding custody

United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1973) (interpreting “first brought” as brought in custody with liberty restrained)
United States v. Hong Vo, 978 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D.D.C. 2013) (D.D.C. discussion of § 3238 and “first brought” distinctions)
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (U.S. 1980) (reasonable-person seizure test: whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave)
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (U.S. 1983) (custody inquiry focuses on formal arrest or restraint of freedom of movement)
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (U.S. 2011) (personal characteristics like age are relevant to custody analysis)
United States v. Moreno, 742 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1984) (alienage and limited English can contribute to effective custody)
United States v. Liang, 224 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000) (brought means first brought into U.S. jurisdiction while in custody)