United States v. Jenkins
120 F. Supp. 3d 650
E.D. Ky.2013Background
- Pennington was attacked on a deserted road in Kingdom Come State Park in spring 2011 by Jason and Anthony Jenkins.
- Pennington is gay, and the case centers on whether the crime was committed ‘because of’ his sexual orientation.
- Jenkins were acquitted of hate crime charges but convicted of kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap.
- The government proposed several ‘because of’ standards (motivating factor, substantial reason, significant factor) for instruction, while the court ultimately adopts a but-for standard.
- Supreme Court decisions (Gross and Lewis) frame the proper interpretation of ‘because of’ as a but-for standard in this context.
- Congress’s intent in the hate crimes statute is analyzed, with the court rejecting broader importation of Title VII standards.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What standard should govern ‘because of’ in § 249? | Pennington (plaintiff) supports but-for standard. | Jenkinses (defendants) favor broader “motivating factor” or mixed-motive standards. | But-for standard applies. |
| Should Title VII’s motivating factor framework apply to hate crimes under § 249? | Plaintiff argues for Title VII-like standard. | Defendant argues for extending mixed-motive framework. | Gross/Lewis control; do not import Title VII standard. |
| Does legislative history support broadening or narrowing the standard for § 249? | Leg history supports broader reach of § 245/§ 249. | Leg history does not modify plain meaning; but-for governs. | Plain meaning governs; but-for standard prevails. |
| Would an expansive standard raise First Amendment concerns? | More expansive standard could chill protected expression. | N/A or not central in ruling. | Court cautions against overbroad interpretation; largely dismisses concerns in ruling. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. McGee, 173 F.3d 952 (6th Cir. 1999) (racial animus as substantial reason; higher bar than motivating factor)
- United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422 (6th Cir. 1986) (early substantial reason framework; cited in Ebens/Bledsoe lineage)
- Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1984) (illustrative mixed-motive instruction allowing other motives)
- United States v. Maybee, 687 F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 2012) (imported ‘substantial motivating factor’ to § 249 context)
- Mullet, 868 F. Supp. 2d 618 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (instruction requiring ‘significant motivating factor’ for religion)
- Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (U.S. 2009) (but-for causation required; rejects motivating-factor standard)
- Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012) (ADA/AGE framework; Gross applies to ADA; but-for standard governs)
- R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992) ( First Amendment concerns in motive-based regulation)
- Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (enhanced penalties for bias-motivated acts)
- Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008) (but-for causation and reliance on statutory text)
- Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (textual interpretation of 'because of' in antidiscrimination context)