United States v. Jeffrey Parkhurst
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13450
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- From January–July 2015 Parkhurst posted sexual "casual encounters" ads (e.g., seeking a "very young white boy") on Craigslist.
- On July 27, Decatur PD Detective Todd Koester, posing as a 15-year-old "Kacy," exchanged sexually explicit messages with Parkhurst and arranged a meeting; Parkhurst was arrested at the meeting location.
- Parkhurst was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) for attempting to entice a minor; a jury convicted him and the district court sentenced him to 132 months’ imprisonment and 15 years’ supervised release.
- At trial Detective Koester testified both as a fact witness (his undercover communications) and as an expert on online child-predator code words; Parkhurst challenged portions of that testimony and the government’s use of Parkhurst’s emails on cross-examination and in closing.
- The district court permitted lay-opinion testimony about the "candy" exchange, qualified Koester as an expert to explain Craigslist "key words," allowed cross-examination about Parkhurst’s email interactions after finding Parkhurst had opened the door, and struck one question/answer about another alleged minor; Parkhurst appealed conviction and sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Parkhurst's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Koester’s "candy" interpretation (lay vs. expert) | Testimony was expert (Rule 702) and unreliable without methodology | It was lay opinion under Rule 701—Koester described his contemporaneous perception | Admitted as lay opinion under Rule 701; no abuse of discretion |
| Admissibility of Koester’s interpretation of July 20 Craigslist ad (expert testimony/Daubert and Rule 704(b)) | Expert testimony unreliable without Daubert-style scientific indicia; testimony impermissibly opined on Parkhurst’s intent (Rule 704(b)) | Testimony was experience-based expert opinion (permitted under Rule 702); it explained common code words and did not assert defendant’s mental state | Admitted—experience-based expert testimony is permissible; did not violate Rule 704(b) because it explained common practices, leaving intent to the jury |
| Dual role (fact witness + expert) — potential jury confusion/prejudice | Koester’s dual-role could confuse jurors and give undue weight to factual testimony | Court instructed jury and examination made clear when testimony was expert vs. factual | Dual-role testimony permissible; district court’s precautions (instruction and questioning) were adequate |
| Use of Parkhurst’s other emails on cross-examination and closing; whether extrinsic evidence/impeachment/prosecutorial misconduct | Emails were not in evidence; cross-examination improperly used extrinsic evidence; closing improperly relied on stricken testimony | Parkhurst opened the door by repeatedly claiming he sought only of-age contacts; cross-examination on credibility was proper under Rule 608(b); closing relied on admissible impeachment testimony, not the stricken remark | Cross-examination about emails was proper impeachment (door opened); rebuttal argument not prejudicial—no reversible prosecutorial misconduct |
| Sentencing enhancement for obstruction based on assertion of innocence | Challenge to enhancement (claimed error) | Government/record: appellant failed to develop argument on appeal | Claim waived for inadequate briefing; enhancement challenge forfeited |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. York, 572 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 2009) (expert testimony interpreting code words may help jury)
- United States v. Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2002) (law-enforcement interpretation of conversation terms admissible)
- United States v. Christian, 673 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2012) (expert testimony must be helpful; caution on dual-capacity witnesses)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (expertise may be based on experience; Daubert flexible)
- United States v. Conn, 297 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 2002) (experience-based expert testimony acceptable; Daubert factors not a rigid checklist)
- United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236 (7th Cir. 1994) (expert may testify about common criminal practices but not defendant’s mental state)
- United States v. Winbush, 580 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 2009) (experts may testify about facts from which jury may infer intent)
- United States v. Kohli, 847 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 2017) (defendant who testifies exposes credibility to impeachment)
- United States v. Sanders, 614 F.3d 341 (7th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing cross-examination on an issue from use of extrinsic evidence)
- United States v. Richards, 719 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2013) (prosecutorial-misconduct framework and prejudice analysis)