United States v. Jeffrey J. Grimes
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26121
| 8th Cir. | 2012Background
- Grimes appeals his 19-count conviction and sentence for stalking and harassing communications via phone and mail; district court denied STA dismissal and multiplicity challenges; certain counts were later vacated; Grimes argued sentencing errors including career-offender status and failure to consider military/mental health factors.
- Grimes was charged with D and E subsections under 47 U.S.C. § 223 for repeated calls and harassing communications, plus other related counts (letters, stalking).
- Grimes was arrested in Virginia, arraigned in South Dakota, and trial occurred in August 2011; STA clock began in SD per district court, leading to a 66-day window before trial after tolling.
- District court determined Grimes had two qualifying prior felonies (Iowa kidnapping and Florida aggravated stalking via nolo contendere plea-adjudication) to support career-offender status; district court sentenced 288 months total and imposed $1,900 in special assessments; on appeal, convictions on Counts 13-17 were vacated and remaining counts affirmed.
- The court ultimately vacated Counts 13-17 and associated assessments, affirmed the other counts and the sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| STA period began in SD; district court erred on timing | Grimes argues STA clock ran from VA appearance | Clock began when indictment was pending in SD | No error; SD was proper start; 66 days elapsed before trial |
| Multiplicity: Count5 (D) vs Counts12-17 (E) | Counts 5 and 12-17 violate Blockburger; same conduct | Each contains unique elements; not multiplicitous | Not multiplicitous; each offense has an element not found in the other |
| Counts12-17 multiplicity; six days of messages as single course of conduct | Six days constitute single impulse; counts multiplicitous | Each day involved different numbers and intents; separate acts | Counts 12-17 multiplicity; remand to vacate Counts 13-17 and related assessments |
| Career-offender determination and sentence reasonableness | Challenge to career-offender status and consideration of military/mental health | Career-offender status supported; district court properly considered factors | No procedural error; 288-month sentence substantively reasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1987) (STA accrual when appearing before district of charges; extradition context)
- United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir. 1994) (STA timing varies by where charges are pending; single court interpretation)
- United States v. O’Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1985) (STA time begins in the district where indictment is pending)
- United States v. Chipps, 410 F.3d 438 (8th Cir. 2005) (Impulse test for multiple counts; course of conduct analysis)
- Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955) (Unit of prosecution; conduct that constitutes multiple acts)
- Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952) (Impulse test language for determining separate offenses)