United States v. Jeffrey Doxey, Jr.
833 F.3d 692
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- ATF and WEMET investigated Jeffrey Doxey after suspects admitted trading stolen guns to him for heroin; a confidential informant (CI) also tipped that Doxey (driving a white Suburban) had recently possessed a large quantity of heroin.
- Officers observed an apparent hand-to-hand drug transaction, stopped Doxey’s vehicle, obtained consent to search his person and vehicle, and seized cash and drug paraphernalia from the SUV and residue at the residence of Doxey’s girlfriend.
- At the station, officers (after confirming Doxey’s parole condition requiring consent to searches) asked Doxey to remove underwear and squat; when he resisted and officers saw a plastic bag protruding between his buttocks, an officer flicked the bag out; it contained 8.17 grams of heroin.
- Doxey was indicted federally for possession with intent to distribute; he moved to suppress (arguing consent and stop violations) and to compel disclosure of the CI; both motions were denied; he was convicted at trial and later sentenced as a career offender.
- On appeal Doxey challenged (1) the constitutionality of the body search (now arguing it was an invasive rectal search), (2) the denial of the CI’s disclosure, and (3) the career-offender designation and predicate convictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Doxey) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fourth Amendment: constitutionality of the search/removal of baggie | The flicking/retrieval was an invasive rectal-cavity search requiring a warrant and violated the Fourth Amendment | Search was either consensual and/or justified as a parole search; baggie was visible and removed without invasive probing | Search was not an invasive rectal-cavity search; viewing facts in government’s favor removal was a limited intrusion, reasonable under parole-search principles; no plain error |
| Disclosure of CI identity (Roviaro issue) | Disclosure necessary to assess case strength and prepare defense; CI’s identity could aid impeachment | CI was a mere tipster; disclosure not necessary and would hinder informant flow | District court did not abuse discretion; CI was a tipster whose identity was not essential to a fair trial; no Confrontation Clause violation |
| Career-offender predicate: use of 2001 conviction committed at 17 | Using a conviction that arose from conduct when Doxey was 17 violates equal protection/due process because other jurisdictions might treat similar conduct as juvenile | Guidelines treat predicates based on whether the offense was an adult conviction in the convicting jurisdiction; Michigan prosecuted him as an adult | Use of the 2001 adult-state conviction as a career-offender predicate is permissible under §4B1.2 comment; equal protection/due process claim fails |
| Career-offender predicate: residual-clause vagueness (Johnson) for fleeing-and-eluding conviction | Fleeing-and-eluding was counted under the Guidelines’ residual clause, which is void for vagueness post-Johnson | Even if the residual clause is invalid, Doxey had at least two qualifying drug-felony predicates without the fleeing conviction | No plain error: district court relied on two drug convictions as predicates, so Johnson-based challenge does not change career-offender classification |
Key Cases Cited
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (warrantless-search rule and consent principles)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (Fourth Amendment protection for searches and surveillance)
- Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (parolees have diminished privacy; searches reasonable under parole scheme)
- Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (informant-identity disclosure balancing test)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (residual-clause vagueness in ACCA)
- Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (reasonableness balancing for searches of detainees)
- Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (heightened privacy interests for bodily intrusions)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (searches of the body implicate special Fourth Amendment concerns)
- United States v. Booker, 728 F.3d 535 (example of highly intrusive body-cavity removal/warrant issues)
- United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902 (applying Johnson to Guidelines’ residual clause)