United States v. Jason Erickson, 692 F. App'x 81

Background

In 2005 Erickson pled guilty to Sexual Exploitation of a Child after child pornography was found on a computer he used; his supervised release barred using or possessing any computer with online access without probation approval and required truthful answers to probation inquiries.
Probation found Erickson in possession of three Internet-capable cell phones and a memory card from a phone containing non‑work downloads from the Internet.
Erickson admitted bypassing an employment-agency computer’s filters to download non‑employment content and later accessing it on his cell phone; he initially denied but later admitted accessing non‑employment websites.
Probation filed a revocation petition; at the revocation hearing Erickson pleaded not guilty but offered no contradictory evidence; the District Court revoked supervised release and imposed nine months imprisonment plus one year supervised release.
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed that Erickson violated the computer‑use and truthful‑response conditions but questioned whether the District Court relied improperly on cell‑phone possession/use—because the release condition referenced only “computer” use and did not explicitly include cell phones.
The Third Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing so the District Court can impose a sanction tied solely to the conduct that actually violated the written conditions.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Erickson violated supervised release by using an employment computer to access non‑employment Internet sites	Erickson admitted bypassing filters and downloading non‑employment content for later phone access	(N/A—Erickson conceded the conduct at hearing)	Violated computer‑use prohibition; sufficient evidence supports revocation
Whether Erickson violated the truthful‑response condition by initially denying Internet access for non‑employment purposes	Erickson initially denied then admitted	Government relied on probation officer testimony and admission	Violated truthful‑response condition; finding not clearly erroneous
Whether cell‑phone possession/use was a prohibited violation under the written condition referencing only “computer” use	Government: condition obviously intended to prevent unmonitored Internet access, which includes cell phones	Erickson: condition mentions only computers; did not clearly prohibit cell phones	Court: cannot assume cell phones are covered by a term that mentions only computers; sanction may not be based on cell‑phone use without clearer notice
Remedy: whether resentencing is required because the district court may have relied on cell‑phone conduct	Government: sanction appropriate as reflecting intent of condition	Erickson: sentence may have been based on conduct not clearly prohibited	Remanded for resentencing so court can impose sanction based solely on conduct that violated the written conditions

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir.) (sentencing judge has wide discretion within 18 U.S.C. § 3583 limits)
United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139 (3d Cir.) (conditions involving computers/internet must be appropriately tailored)
United States v. Blackmon, 557 F.3d 113 (3d Cir.) (standard for reviewing factual findings)
United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766 (3d Cir.) (standard for reviewing supervised release revocation)
United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562 (3d Cir.) (preponderance standard supports revocation findings)
United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.) (revocation may be found by preponderance under § 3583)
United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270 (3d Cir.) (clear‑error review and credibility of witness testimony)
United States v. Cunningham, 694 F.3d 372 (3d Cir.) (example of supervised‑release language distinguishing computers and cell phones)