United States v. Jason Dvorin
817 F.3d 438
| 5th Cir. | 2016Background
- Jason Dvorin, a Pavillion Bank customer, participated in a five-year informal arrangement with bank VP Chris Derrington whereby Derrington processed checks Dvorin expected would not clear, giving Dvorin temporary access to funds; auditors later discovered the scheme.
- Dvorin was indicted and convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud; Derrington, who had pleaded guilty and cooperated, testified at the first trial and denied receiving promises from the government.
- Appellate counsel discovered the government had not disclosed a sealed plea-agreement supplement promising the government might file a motion for sentencing consideration if Derrington provided substantial assistance; the conviction was vacated and the case remanded for a new trial.
- The district court issued a show-cause hearing and found the original prosecutor, Mindy Sauter, committed Brady, Giglio, and Napue violations and acted with reckless disregard, but declined to impose sanctions; a new prosecution team tried the case a second time.
- At the second trial Dvorin was reconvicted; the government added a forfeiture notice in the second superseding indictment and the district court entered a forfeiture judgment; Dvorin appealed, challenging multiple evidentiary rulings and the forfeiture as vindictive.
- The Fifth Circuit vacated the forfeiture judgment for prosecutorial vindictiveness but affirmed the conviction and all other rulings; it also affirmed the district court’s findings that Sauter violated Brady, Giglio, and Napue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Dvorin / Sauter) | Defendant's Argument (Government / Sauter) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Refusal to give an apparent-authority jury instruction | Dvorin: needed a specific instruction so jury could consider his reliance on bank official’s apparent authority as negating intent to defraud | Government: the good-faith/willfulness instruction adequately covered the defense | Court: No abuse of discretion; existing good-faith instruction sufficiently covered the defense |
| Refusal to give special unanimity instruction | Dvorin: risk jury convicted on different acts; needed unanimity on same conspiracy | Government: general unanimity and pattern multiple-conspiracy instruction sufficient for a single conspiracy charged | Court: No error; single-conspiracy facts made special unanimity instruction unnecessary |
| Admission of witnesses using terms like “fraud,” “fraudulent checks,” “conspiracy” | Dvorin: such testimony improperly opined on mental state, violating Rules 701/704 | Government: terms used in context to describe instruments/transactions, not direct opinion on mens rea | Court: No abuse; usage construed as describing documents/acts, not direct statement of defendant’s intent |
| Exclusion of district court’s tentative findings (that Derrington lied) from cross-examination / extrinsic evidence | Dvorin: exclusion violated Sixth Amendment confrontation and Fed. R. Evid. 608 | Government: disclosure of judge’s findings would be prejudicial and confusion outweighs probative value | Held: No Sixth Amendment violation; court properly limited evidence under Rule 403 and trial fairness concerns |
| Prosecutorial misconduct (Brady/Giglio/Napue) and sanctions | Dvorin: non-disclosure and allowing false testimony warranted dismissal or other severe sanctions; Sauter appeals reputational findings | Government / Sauter: nondisclosure not intentional; supplement not material; no basis for severe sanctions | Held: Court affirmed district findings that Sauter violated Brady, Giglio, and Napue and acted recklessly; but district court did not abuse discretion in declining severe sanctions given lack of bad faith and remedy of a new trial (no abuse) |
| Late disclosure of Chase witness (Arthemis Lindsay) | Dvorin: late ID violated discovery order and prejudiced defense; testimony should be excluded | Government: had legitimate reasons; defense could interview witness and was not prejudiced | Held: No abuse of discretion permitting testimony; factors (lack of bad faith, limited prejudice, cure by lunch interview) support admission |
| Addition of forfeiture notice after remand (prosecutorial vindictiveness) | Dvorin: adding forfeiture after appeal/remand was vindictive and violated due process | Government: addition was correction of prior omission, based on new analysis and office practice; no vindictiveness | Held: Presumption of vindictiveness applies; government failed to rebut it by preponderance; forfeiture judgment vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (prosecutor must disclose promises that affect witness credibility)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecution must disclose materially exculpatory or impeaching evidence)
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (prosecutor may not knowingly use false testimony)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (materiality standard for nondisclosure: reasonable probability undermining confidence in outcome)
- United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (prosecutorial charging decisions and due-process limits on vindictiveness)
- United States v. Krezdorn, 718 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir.) (framework for presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness)
- United States v. Simpson, 741 F.3d 539 (5th Cir.) (forfeiture jury-rights holding referenced by district court)
- United States v. Aubin, 87 F.3d 141 (5th Cir. 1996) (good-faith instruction can preserve apparent-authority defense)