United States v. Jason Brown
819 F.3d 800
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- Jason Brown was indicted for four counts of distributing heroin and crack; arraigned Feb 25, 2014; trial ultimately set for Sept. 2014 after competency proceedings and counsel changes.
- Government moved to continue Sept. 8 trial because a probation officer witness (Phillips) had pre-scheduled trainings; court initially granted a continuance to Sept. 22, then proposed an alternative: select a jury on Sept. 8 (voir dire), recess, and resume trial Sept. 22 (the “start-and-stop plan”).
- Brown objected in writing (Sept. 4) to any continuance and orally objected at the Sept. 8 pretrial conference to starting and recessing the trial; voir dire proceeded, 14 jurors were sworn, and the jury was ordered to return Sept. 22. The court later excluded Sept. 15–22 as excludable time.
- Trial resumed Sept. 22; Brown was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 288 months; the court also revoked supervised release and added a consecutive 24-month term. Brown appealed.
- On appeal Brown argued (1) the start-and-stop plan violated the Speedy Trial Act (STA); (2) ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to move to dismiss; and (3) due-process violations from being excluded from pretrial teleconferences.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Brown) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court’s start-and-stop plan (voir dire + two-week recess) violated the Speedy Trial Act | The plan was a sham to evade the STA; voir dire within 70 days but trial effectively began after the 70th day | The procedure complied with STA because voir dire began within 70 days and the week Sept.15–22 was excludable (counsel/witness unavailability) | Court held the plan violated the spirit of the STA and that trial did not legitimately commence on Sept. 8; convictions vacated and remanded to decide dismissal with/without prejudice |
| Whether the period Sept.15–22 was excludable under STA (ends-of-justice or unavailability) | Phillips’ training and counsel conflicts did not justify exclusion; government failed to exercise due diligence; counsel availability alone is not a proper automatic exclusion | Argued witness unavailability and attorneys’ conflicting commitments justified exclusion under §3161(h) and (h)(7) | Court found exclusion improper: government counsel’s lack of diligence and no on-record §3161(h)(7) balancing; time exclusion was erroneous |
| Whether Brown’s oral objections satisfied §3162(a)(2)’s “motion of the defendant” requirement | Oral objections and written opposition put the court on notice and therefore satisfied the motion requirement | Government argued Brown waived relief by not filing a written/formal §3162 motion after the 70th day (relying on Sherer) | Court held an oral objection that clearly notifies the court of an alleged STA violation satisfies §3162(a)(2) (but normally written is preferred) |
| Whether Sherer precludes Brown’s relief because his objections were raised prior to day 70 | Brown contends Sherer is distinguishable where the court’s start-and-stop plan created confusion about when trial commenced | Government contends Sherer requires a motion filed after day 70; Brown’s pre-70 objections were therefore premature/waived | Court distinguished Sherer on the facts (start-and-stop plan produced court-created ambiguity) and declined to apply it; Sherer did not bar relief here |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Crane, 776 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1985) (condemning procedures designed to "pay lip service" to the STA and requiring proper ends-of-justice findings)
- United States v. Richmond, 735 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1984) (voir dire followed by recess may be permissible only where record shows appropriate justification and on-the-record balancing)
- United States v. Sherer, 770 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2014) (motion under STA is effective only for delay predating its filing; holding that a challenge should be brought on day 71 or later)
- United States v. Tinklenberg, 563 U.S. 647 (U.S. 2011) (STA rules on commencement and effect of pretrial motions on the statutory clock)
- United States v. Scaife, 749 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1984) (warning courts against evading STA by impaneling juries within the statutory period then pausing trial)
- United States v. Sobh, 571 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 2009) (discussing excludable delay and the need for on-the-record findings for ends-of-justice continuances)
- United States v. Alvarez-Perez, 629 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding an oral assertion of an STA violation can satisfy §3162(a)(2) when it brings the issue to the court’s attention)
- United States v. Arnold, 113 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 1997) (treating an oral STA claim presented to the court as satisfying the motion requirement)