United States v. James Snyder, 71 F.4th 555

Background

James E. Snyder, elected mayor of Portage, Indiana (2012), oversaw two public bids (2012–2013) for city garbage trucks; both contracts awarded to Great Lakes Peterbilt (GLPB).
Snyder placed friend Randy Reeder in charge of bidding; trial evidence showed Reeder drafted bid specs favoring GLPB and Snyder had repeated communications with GLPB owners (the Buhas) while other bidders were not contacted.
Less than three weeks after the second contract award, GLPB issued Snyder a $13,000 check; Snyder gave varying explanations (consulting, payroll, lobbying) and produced no corroborating contracts or invoices.
Separately, Snyder owned First Financial Trust Mortgage, which owed payroll taxes and was levied by the IRS; he arranged to operate as a division of GVC Mortgage, formed SRC Properties, routed payments to SRC, and omitted SRC and GVC employment on multiple Form 433‑A financial disclosures.
Snyder was indicted on federal funds bribery (18 U.S.C. § 666) and obstruction of IRS administration (26 U.S.C. § 7212(a)), convicted, given a new trial on bribery, retried, reconvicted, and sentenced; he appeals multiple pretrial, evidentiary, statutory, and constitutional rulings.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Seizure/filtering of Snyder's emails (Fourth / Sixth Amendment)	Govt: executed warrant, used a filter/taint procedure to protect privilege; remedy for taint is suppression, not dismissal.	Snyder: warrant was overbroad and the government’s taint team (non‑lawyers, no court or defense oversight) intruded on attorney‑client communications, violating Fourth and Sixth Amendments and requiring dismissal/disqualification.	Court: No Sixth Amendment violation because right had not attached at seizure; even if attachment asserted, no purposeful intrusion or prejudice shown. Fourth Amendment overbreadth, if any, warrants suppression remedies; dismissal denied.
Obstruction of IRS — statute of limitations (26 U.S.C. § 7212(a))	Govt: indictment alleges corrupt acts within 6‑year window (post‑Nov 17, 2010) — e.g., routing GVC payments to SRC and omissions on 433‑A forms — so limitations satisfied.	Snyder: paragraphs describing pre‑2010 payroll diversion fall outside the 6‑year period and should be struck as surplusage; these older acts cannot be used to revive stale charges.	Court: District court did not abuse discretion; earlier acts were intertwined with post‑2010 obstructive acts alleged in the indictment, so inclusion was proper and the indictment alleged timely corrupt acts.
Obstruction of IRS — sufficiency of evidence	Govt: evidence showed levies, concealment of SRC and income on 433‑A forms, routing of payments to SRC, and intent to gain an unlawful advantage, supporting conviction under omnibus clause.	Snyder: payments later made, installment plan permitted, omissions may be explainable or reflected on missing pages, SRC had little income, and conduct could not have impeded IRS collection.	Court: Evidence (levies, diversion of funds, omissions on 433‑A, timing and pattern of conduct) was sufficient for a rational jury to find corrupt intent and that conduct impeded IRS; conviction affirmed.
Federal funds bribery (18 U.S.C. § 666) — scope and sufficiency; speedy‑trial challenges	Govt: § 666(a)(1)(B)’s language (“influenced or rewarded”) covers bribes and gratuities; evidence (tailored bids, contacts with Buhas, timing of payment, lack of consulting records) supports conviction; delays were excused/excludable and pandemic‑related.	Snyder: § 666 requires quid pro quo (bribe) and does not reach mere gratuities; here the $13,000 was at most a post‑hoc gratuity or bona fide consulting fee; retrial delay violated Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment on facts.	Court: Seventh Circuit precedent holds § 666 reaches gratuities; evidence at both trials was sufficient (circumstantial proof of corrupt intent); Speedy Trial Act claim forfeited/waived and pandemic/other reasons justified delay for Sixth Amendment purposes.

Key Cases Cited

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (Sixth Amendment not automatically violated by undercover presence; need proof of purposeful intrusion or use to defendant’s detriment)
Morrison v. Olson, 449 U.S. 361 (1981) (remedy for unlawful searches and seizures in criminal prosecutions is suppression, not dismissal)
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191 (2008) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at initiation of adversary judicial proceedings)
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (attaching right to counsel does not depend on whether suspect had retained counsel prior to charges)
Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018) (§ 7212(a) omnibus clause requires corrupt action with nexus to a targeted tax proceeding that was pending or reasonably foreseeable)
In re: Search Warrant Issued June 13, 2019, 942 F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2019) (criticized executive‑branch privilege review where seizure was extensive and many non‑targets’ privileged communications were at risk)
In re Search of Elec. Commc’ns, 802 F.3d 516 (3d Cir. 2015) (cautioned about non‑attorney privilege reviews and urged protections, though not announcing a categorical constitutional rule)
United States v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 1183 (7th Cir. 1997) (distinguishing bribe and gratuity concepts under federal bribery jurisprudence)
United States v. Mullins, 800 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2015) (section 666 reaches gratuities as well as bribes under Seventh Circuit precedent)