United States v. James Newman
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11683
| 7th Cir. | 2014Background
- Newman and Misleveck escaped custody, stole a shotgun, kidnapped a driver, carjacked and fled; they were later captured in Florida.
- Newman pleaded guilty in federal court to being a felon in possession of a shotgun under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1); after changing counsel he sought to withdraw his plea for lack of factual basis.
- At the plea colloquy Newman described joint criminal activity but did not concede physically handling the shotgun; he asserted he believed presence with someone who had a gun equated to possession.
- The district court denied withdrawal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B) and sentenced Newman to 120 months; Newman appealed the denial of plea withdrawal (not the sentence).
- The court treated Newman’s collaboration with Misleveck as establishing conspiracy, Pinkerton/agency attribution, and/or aiding-and-abetting liability such that Misleveck’s possession could be imputed to Newman.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plea lacked factual basis because Newman never possessed the gun | Newman: plea rests only on constructive possession by mere presence; he is innocent of possession | Government: factual statements support inference of joint control, or alternatively imputation via conspiracy/aid-and-abet | Court: affirmed — conviction supported by imputed liability (Pinkerton/§2 aiding-and-abetting/Rosemond principles) |
| Whether Newman’s misunderstanding of constructive possession invalidates plea withdrawal under Rule 11(d)(2)(B) | Newman: his erroneous legal view is a fair-and-just reason to withdraw plea | Government: a defendant need not understand the precise legal theory so long as factual basis supports conviction | Held: misunderstanding of theory does not invalidate plea because factual basis supports imputed liability |
| Whether Pinkerton/attribution can support §922(g)(1) conviction for a conspirator who did not personally handle the gun | Newman: Pinkerton should not apply to felon-in-possession prosecutions | Government: Pinkerton and agency principles permit attribution where co-conspirator committed the offense in furtherance of the venture | Held: Attribution is proper here; Misleveck’s possession imputable to Newman given joint criminal venture |
| Whether Rosemond limits attribution such that Newman cannot be convicted when he did not physically wield the gun | Newman: Rosemond requires more specific participation or contemporaneous opportunity to withdraw | Government: Rosemond supports liability where a participant knew of the gun and continued to cooperate | Held: Rosemond reinforces liability for a participant who knew of the gun and remained in the venture; Newman liable to same extent as possessor |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Rawlings, 341 F.3d 657 (7th Cir.) (discusses constructive possession and attribution principles)
- Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014) (a participant who knows a confederate has a gun and remains in the venture can be liable)
- Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (conspirator liability: acts of one partner may be attributed to all when in furtherance of the conspiracy)
- United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858 (7th Cir.) (addressed limits of attributing a co-conspirator’s gun possession; court distinguishes facts here)
- United States v. Rice, 116 F.3d 267 (7th Cir.) (a guilty plea need not reflect the defendant’s precise understanding of the legal theory supporting conviction)
- United States v. Moore, 936 F.2d 1508 (7th Cir.) (aiding-and-abetting liability is a permissible basis for conviction)
- United States v. Misleveck, 735 F.3d 983 (7th Cir.) (related appeal by co-defendant; context for factual narrative)
- United States v. Macey, 8 F.3d 462 (7th Cir.) (Pinkerton attribution principles applied in circuit)
- United States v. Alcala, 678 F.3d 574 (7th Cir.) (appellate review of Rule 11(d)(2)(B) is deferential)
- United States v. Hodges, 259 F.3d 655 (7th Cir.) (innocence can be a compelling reason to withdraw a plea)