928 F.3d 763
8th Cir.2019Background
- James D. Myers pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced as an Armed Career Criminal (ACCA) to 188 months’ imprisonment.
- The ACCA enhancement was based on one prior serious drug conviction and two Arkansas violent-felony convictions: first-degree terroristic threatening and second-degree battery.
- Myers challenged the ACCA designation on appeal, arguing Arkansas first-degree terroristic threatening and second-degree battery are not "violent felonies" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). The Eighth Circuit originally affirmed; the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for consideration of the Solicitor General’s position.
- The relevant Arkansas statute (A.C.A. § 5-13-301(a)(1)(A)) criminalized threats to cause death or serious physical injury or substantial property damage with the purpose of terrorizing another.
- The key legal question was whether the statute is divisible (lists alternative elements) so the court may apply the modified categorical approach to determine which statutory alternative formed the conviction.
- The court reviewed state-court interpretations and charging/sentencing documents and concluded Myers was convicted of threatening to kill his girlfriend (i.e., threatened use of physical force), and that his second-degree battery conviction remained a violent felony.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Arkansas first-degree terroristic threatening is a violent felony under ACCA | Myers: statute overbroad because it criminalizes threats of substantial property damage and thus may not involve threatened physical force against a person | Government: conviction charged threatening death to a person; statute is divisible so the court can identify the violent alternative | Held: Statute is divisible; modified categorical approach applies; Myers was convicted of threatening to kill (threatened use of physical force), so it is a violent felony |
| Whether the court should apply categorical or modified categorical approach | Myers: statute is indivisible / overbroad so categorical approach shows non-violent conduct possible | Government: state law treats alternatives as elements, making statute divisible and permitting modified categorical inquiry | Held: State precedent treats alternatives as elements; use modified categorical approach |
| Whether the charging/sentencing documents show which statutory alternative Myers violated | Myers: (argues overbreadth) | Government: charging information and sentencing order indicate threat to kill girlfriend while holding a knife to her throat | Held: Documents show Myers threatened to kill his girlfriend; violent-force element satisfied |
| Whether Myers’ second-degree battery conviction qualifies as a violent felony | Myers: contends it does not | Government: maintains it qualifies under prior holdings | Held: Prior Eighth Circuit holding that second-degree battery is a violent felony remains controlling; affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Myers v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1540 (2019) (Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of Solicitor General’s brief)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (distinguishes elements from means; governs divisibility inquiry)
- Castleman v. United States, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (categorical approach for determining violent-felony elements)
- United States v. Rice, 813 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2016) (threatened use of physical force satisfies crime-of-violence analysis)
- United States v. Myers, 896 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2018) (prior Eighth Circuit opinion in this case)
- Mathis-related analogues and Eighth Circuit precedent: Winston v. United States, 845 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2017) (modified categorical approach guidance)
- Martin v. United States, 904 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2018) (realistic-probability test for overbroad statutes)
- Walker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 10 (Ark. App. 2012) (Arkansas court treating alternatives as elements for first-degree terroristic threatening)
- Mason v. State, 206 S.W.3d 869 (Ark. 2005) (Arkansas Supreme Court treating threat to cause death/serious injury as satisfying statute without need for property-damage alternative)