United States v. James Dixon
901 F.3d 1322
| 11th Cir. | 2018Background
- Four members of the self-described “Big Money Team” (Chacon, Altamirano, Portela, Dixon) were tried for a drug conspiracy to distribute ≥280 g of cocaine base and related offenses after undercover buys, cooperator testimony, surveillance, social-media evidence, a traffic stop that produced a gun and marijuana, and a post-arrest jail interview.
- Cooperating witnesses (Guzman, Zerquera) described an organized local marketplace (“traps”) where Team members sold drugs, shared customers, pooled money at times, served as lookouts, and used robberies and weapons to sustain operations; Chacon and Altamirano were described as “top guys.”
- Police recovered drugs and a gun at a trap after an armed robbery; Portela was stopped in a car with marijuana and a gun beneath the seat and later made incriminating statements at the jail after waiving rights.
- Pretrial suppression and competency claims were litigated; the district court denied Portela’s suppression motion and declined to order a competency hearing sua sponte; Chacon’s motion for acquittal on two robbery counts was granted, but related references at closing produced no mistrial.
- The jury convicted the four defendants on the counts at issue; district court sentences ranged from 144 months to 420 months; Portela accepted a 360‑month sentence with an appeal waiver.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for single conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 | Gov: market‑style cooperation at traps, shared customers/money, lookouts, robberies and guns show a single conspiracy | Defs: independent dealers, no boss, separate conspiracies; lack of proof each joined a single conspiracy | Affirmed: ample evidence of a single conspiracy and slight corroboration suffices to connect each defendant to it |
| Portela: suppression of car search & jail statements (Fourth & Sixth Amendments) | Portela: lacked consent/standing; search unconstitutional; jail statements obtained despite right to counsel | Gov: Portela had no reasonable expectation of privacy as a passenger; officers smelled marijuana (probable cause); Portela initiated jail conversation about federal probe | Affirmed denial: Portela lacked standing; automobile exception and probable cause; Sixth Amendment not violated because Portela initiated the conversation |
| Chacon: admission of uncharged conduct, entrapment instruction request, mistrial for prosecutor references | Chacon: intrinsic/unfairly prejudicial evidence and improper closing argument; entrapment instruction required re firearm charge | Gov: evidence was intrinsic to conspiracy (robberies, guns, marijuana), prosecutor’s misstatement was inadvertent and cured by instruction, entrapment irrelevant to possession charge | Affirmed: evidence admissible as intrinsic and not unfairly prejudicial; no mistrial; entrapment instruction properly denied because charge was possession, not government‑induced sale |
| Sentencing (Chacon): leadership enhancement, drug‑quantity attribution, criminal history, substantive reasonableness | Chacon: court clearly erred in applying leader role, attributing ≥2.8 kg, counting juvenile/diversionary prior points, and imposed an excessive sentence | Gov: record supports leadership, conservative quantity estimate from cooperator testimony, criminal‑history scoring appropriate or harmless, within‑Guidelines sentence appropriate | Affirmed: factual findings not clearly erroneous; quantity and leadership supported; any criminal‑history dispute did not affect Guideline range; 420 months reasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Duperval, 777 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir.) (standard for de novo review of sufficiency of evidence)
- United States v. Westry, 524 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir.) (marketplace-style cooperation can establish a single conspiracy)
- United States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082 (11th Cir.) (‘marketplace’ concept supports conspiracy finding)
- United States v. Richardson, 532 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir.) (factors for proving single overarching conspiracy)
- Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018) (Fourth Amendment expectations of privacy and vehicle searches)
- Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (co-conspirator liability for foreseeable offenses in furtherance of conspiracy)
- United States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir.) (nexus and factors for § 924(c) possession‑in‑furtherance assessment)
- United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942 (11th Cir.) (Pinkerton instruction standards)
- United States v. Reeves, 742 F.3d 487 (11th Cir.) (use of evidence to approximate attributable drug quantity)
- Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988) (entrapment instruction entitlement threshold)
