United States v. James Burrow, 696 F. App'x 214

Bondsman Kevin Ratigan repeatedly visited James Burrow’s residence between November 7 and December 31 searching for fugitive Matthew Cohagan under a bail-bond contract that Burrow had signed.
On December 31 Ratigan entered and searched Burrow’s home; he later called police, Burrow was arrested, and evidence from the search led to Burrow’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Burrow moved to suppress evidence, arguing that Ratigan was acting as a government agent, that the private search violated the Fourth Amendment, and that the warrant later obtained was invalid.
The district court denied suppression, finding Burrow consented to Ratigan’s search; Burrow appealed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The majority concluded Burrow’s contractual consent to searches to locate Cohagan encompassed the December 31 search and that finding Cohagan was at least one significant motive for Ratigan’s conduct.
A dissent argued the record did not clearly show Cohagan was a significant motive for the December 31 search, that Ratigan’s conduct might have exceeded the scope of consent, and that the case should be remanded for factual findings about government agency and scope.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Burrow voluntarily consented to Ratigan’s entry and search	Burrow: Consent was coerced/acquiescence to bondsman’s claimed right; Bumper bar applies	Govt: Burrow contractually consented to searches for Cohagan; consent was voluntary	Held: Consent was voluntary under totality; district court not clearly erroneous
Whether the December 31 search exceeded the scope of consent	Burrow: Contract authorized searching for Cohagan only; the search aimed to find Burrow’s gun, not Cohagan	Govt: Finding Cohagan was at least one significant motive; search within scope	Held: The search fell within the scope because finding Cohagan was a significant motive
Whether Ratigan was a government agent such that Fourth Amendment limits apply	Burrow: If Ratigan acted as an agent, the search could be unconstitutional	Govt: Court did not need to decide agency because consent validated the search	Held: Court avoided agency question — even if Ratigan were an agent, consent cures the Fourth Amendment issue
Whether factual disputes require remand	Burrow: Record ambiguous about Ratigan’s motive; remand required for district factfinding	Govt: Evidence admits only one reasonable conclusion that Cohagan was a motive	Held: No remand; evidence supports single conclusion that Cohagan was a significant motive (majority). Dissent would remand.

United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2012) (standard of review for suppression denials)
United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2000) (consent reviewed for clear error as factual question)
United States v. Brown, 563 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2009) (warrantless searches and government burden to prove voluntary consent)
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (consent invalid if based on assertion of lawful authority)
United States v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1988) (factors for evaluating voluntariness of consent)
United States v. Cleaveland, 38 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1994) (private actor not an agent when motivated by independent legitimate interest)
United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982) (distinguishing private-searches motivated by recovery of private property)