United States v. Jamal Cooper, 893 F.3d 840

Background

In March 2014 the government obtained a 30-day electronic surveillance order based on a single application that targeted two cellphones: TT1 (Eric Williams) and TT2 (Jamal Cooper). The court issued one wiretap order covering both phones.
The government intercepted calls from Cooper on TT2 for about two weeks; Cooper last used TT2 on April 12 and the government stopped TT2 surveillance after confirming nonuse on April 14. The TT2 recordings were submitted to the district court for sealing on April 16. No interceptions were made from TT1 because Williams had stopped using that phone before March 31.
Cooper was charged with drug-trafficking. He moved to suppress evidence derived from the TT2 wiretap on multiple grounds: improper use of one application for two targets, lack of necessity showing, material misrepresentations/omissions in the affidavit (requesting a Franks hearing), failure to seal recordings “immediately,” and lack of proof that confidential informants voluntarily consented to recordings.
The district court denied the suppression motions without an evidentiary hearing; Cooper later pled guilty while reserving the right to appeal the suppression rulings.
The Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo, and affirmed the denial of suppression.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Cooper)	Defendant's Argument (Gov’t)	Held
Whether one application may support wiretaps of multiple phones	Statute requires a separate application per wiretap; single application was invalid	Statute does not require separate applications; single application is permissible	Rejected Cooper’s claim; single application for multiple phones is allowed
Whether affidavit showed necessity for wiretap under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c)	Affidavit failed to show traditional techniques were tried or why they would fail	52‑page affidavit documented attempted methods and explained why others were unlikely or too dangerous	Affidavit sufficiently demonstrated necessity; district court’s finding not clearly erroneous
Whether materially false statements or omissions in the affidavit entitled Cooper to a Franks hearing	Affidavit contained five misleading/false statements (dates/extent of surveillance, pen register timing, boilerplate insufficiency)	Officer’s statements were accurate or reasonable in context; alleged correctives were in the affidavit and not misleading	No substantial showing of deliberate/reckless falsehoods or material omissions; Franks hearing not required
Whether recordings were not sealed “immediately” under § 2518(8)(a)	Last interception April 12; submitting for sealing on April 16 was not immediate and requires suppression	“Immediately” means within one or two days; government submitted within two days of confirming nonuse and well before warrant expiration	Submission on April 16 satisfied the statute’s “immediately” requirement
Whether informants voluntarily consented to being recorded so gov’t could rely on one-party consent	Informants may not have given voluntary consent; some may have been on probation/parole creating policy issues	Recordings themselves show informants knew and consented; even if policy violated, it does not negate consent	Court found consent (reviewed for clear error) and no authority made gov’t’s burden higher; held admissible

Key Cases Cited

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (establishes standard for evidentiary hearings when warrant affidavits contain alleged falsehoods or omissions)
United States v. Young, 847 F.3d 328 (6th Cir. 2017) (standard of review for suppression rulings: factual findings for clear error, legal conclusions de novo)
United States v. Rose, 714 F.3d 362 (6th Cir. 2013) (applies Franks standard in the Sixth Circuit)
United States v. Wilkinson, 53 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 1995) (interprets “immediately” in § 2518(8)(a) to mean within one or two days)
United States v. Moncivais, 401 F.3d 751 (6th Cir. 2005) (recorded conversations may demonstrate informant consent)