United States v. Jalen Howard, 67 F.4th 876

Jalen Howard was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm; he appealed arguing Batson error during jury selection.
During voir dire three Black venirepersons were struck by the government; Howard challenges only the strike of Juror 24 (Black female).
Juror 24 stated she “really don’t use the internet”; the prosecutor explained he generally disbelieves jurors who say they do not use the internet and struck her for that reason.
The prosecutor also struck Juror 13 (a white male) who likewise had been identified as not using the internet.
At Batson step three the district court briefly noted the prosecutor “does happen to be African-American,” then recessed to research Batson law, returned, and found the government’s internet-nonuse justification credible and the Batson challenge failed.
Howard argued the court erred by injecting the prosecutor’s race into the Batson analysis and by failing to make independent demeanor findings; the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court erred by referencing the prosecutor’s race during the Batson inquiry	United States: The aside was a stray remark and harmless—court proceeded properly through Batson and made credibility findings	Howard: The court improperly considered the prosecutor’s race, which is legally erroneous and taints the Batson analysis	Harmless error. The remark did not infect the court’s reasoning; court researched Batson and based ruling on permissible credibility findings
Whether the court clearly erred in accepting the prosecutor’s race-neutral reason (internet‑nonuse) and in failing to make demeanor findings	United States: Prosecutor applied a consistent, race-neutral rule (disbelieves jurors who deny internet use) and struck all jurors who made that claim, including a similarly situated white juror	Howard: The proffer was pretextual; the court failed to independently assess juror demeanor and should have found discriminatory intent	No clear error. Trial court’s credibility determination was plausible and entitled to deference; demeanor findings were not required where credibility did not depend on juror affect

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (establishes three-step test prohibiting race-based peremptory strikes)
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) (explains comparative juror analysis and importance of credibility at Batson step three)
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (trial-court credibility determinations on Batson are factual and entitled to deference)
Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488 (2016) (reinforces deference to trial-court findings except in exceptional circumstances)
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) (demeanor-based justifications implicate the need for careful credibility assessment)
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (says implausible or fantastic justifications may indicate pretext)
United States v. Rutledge, 648 F.3d 555 (7th Cir. 2011) (trial court erred where it relied on prosecutor’s shared race and failed to evaluate credibility)
Morgan v. City of Chicago, 822 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2016) (trial courts should state on the record credibility/demeanor findings when necessary)