United States v. Jaime Vasquez-Benitez
919 F.3d 546
| D.C. Cir. | 2019Background
- Vasquez-Benitez is a Salvadoran national who was previously removed and reentered the U.S.; ICE civilly detained him under the INA and the U.S. Attorney charged him criminally under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 for unlawful reentry.
- Magistrate and an initial district judge ordered release under the Bail Reform Act (BRA), finding he was not a flight risk or danger; the U.S. Attorney sought revocation but a second district judge agreed to release him with conditions.
- After the U.S. Marshal released him, ICE took custody; Vasquez-Benitez moved to compel his release from ICE or dismiss the criminal charge; the grand jury later indicted him and he pleaded not guilty.
- The district court (on Sept. 26) ordered ICE could not civilly detain him while he was ordered released under the BRA, reasoning that § 3142(d) displaces INA detention and raising separation-of-powers concerns.
- The D.C. Circuit affirmed the BRA release decision (no clear error that he is not a flight risk) but reversed the injunction preventing ICE from civilly detaining him pending removal, holding BRA and INA detention can coexist.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court erred in releasing Vasquez-Benitez under the Bail Reform Act | Vasquez: BRA detention unnecessary because he is not a flight risk or danger (family ties, job, immigration incentives to stay) | U.S. Attorney: He is a flight risk given removal history and alleged gang ties | Affirmed — district court did not clearly err in finding he is not a flight risk and release was appropriate under §3142(g). |
| Whether ICE may civilly detain a removable alien during a pending criminal prosecution after a BRA release | Vasquez: Court-ordered BRA release should preclude simultaneous INA detention; BRA §3142(d) is specific and displaces INA detention; constitutional concerns | Government: INA civil detention serves distinct, permissible removal purpose and coexists with BRA; no constitutional or statutory conflict | Reversed — BRA does not preempt INA detention; ICE may detain for removal so long as purpose is removal, not to evade BRA orders. |
| Whether §3142(d) supplants INA detention when a removable alien is charged criminally | Vasquez: §3142(d) is the specific statutory mechanism for detainees who are removable, so it governs | Government: §3142(d) applies only when judge finds risk; INA detention authority is separate and independent | Reversed — §3142(d) is not exclusive; it applies only if judicial officer finds risk; INA remains applicable otherwise. |
| Whether separation-of-powers prohibits concurrent INA detention when BRA authorizes release | Vasquez: Dual detention by Executive undermines judicial supervisory role in criminal process | Government: Executive immigration detention for removal does not intrude on judicial role if detention is for removal purpose | Reversed — no constitutional conflict where INA detention is for removal and not to frustrate BRA. |
Key Cases Cited
- Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (standard of review for legal conclusions reviewed de novo)
- United States v. Vortis, 785 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (preponderance standard for detention findings)
- United States v. Smith, 79 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (appellate review standard for danger determinations)
- United States v. Xulam, 84 F.3d 441 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (deference to trial court on detention decisions)
- Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (civil immigration detention constitutionally permissible to effectuate removal)
- Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (when statutes can coexist, courts should give effect to both absent clear congressional intent)
- Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820 (1976) (specific statutory scheme may pre-empt general remedies)
- United States v. Veloz-Alonso, 910 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2018) (BRA does not displace INA detention; no conflict between statutes)