United States v. Jaime C. Lopez
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16492
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- Jaime Lopez solicited about $450,000 (2009–2011) from four non-family investors into promissory-note investments managed through entities he controlled (JCL entities) and Midland/Entrust IRA.
- Lopez represented funds would be invested in public companies, but instead deposited investor funds into JCL accounts and his wife’s 413 Solutions account; only $45,000 was used in an E*Trade account and lost.
- Lopez made periodic payments to investors that the government characterized as payments of interest funded by other investors’ principal ("lulling payments").
- Lopez unilaterally altered note terms to extend maturities and lower returns without investors’ consent; he also used substantial funds for personal expenses.
- Indictment charged 15 counts of wire fraud, 4 counts of money laundering, and 1 count of securities fraud; jury convicted on all counts and Lopez appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Lopez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Use of term "lulling payments" by summary witness | Term accurately summarizes records showing payments were funded by other investors and is permissible summary testimony | Term imparted opinion about intent beyond summary witness scope and prejudiced jury | Admissible; not improper opinion; cross-examination was adequate; no abuse of discretion |
| Government references to Bernie Madoff in closing | Limited analogy to Madoff’s use of lulling payments to explain purpose of payments to jury | Reference was inflammatory and unjustified, prejudicing a fair trial | Not reversible error; comments not clearly improper and evidence against Lopez was overwhelming |
| Preclusion of calling Alerding an "expert" to jury | Court allowed Alerding’s opinion testimony but prohibited the label to avoid undue juror deference | Prohibition deprived Lopez of the benefit of expert status and confused Rule 702 analysis | No abuse of discretion; testimony and credentials were presented, and any error was harmless |
| Exclusion of extrinsic evidence (Agent Shivers) to impeach Danny Cole | Cole’s in-court admission cured the inconsistency, so extrinsic proof unnecessary | Extrinsic evidence admissible under Rule 613(b) to emphasize prior inconsistent statement | Exclusion was error but harmless because the inconsistency was fully aired to jury |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Causey, 748 F.3d 310 (7th Cir.) (abuse-of-discretion review for evidentiary rulings)
- United States v. Pree, 408 F.3d 855 (7th Cir.) (summary witness may draw conclusions from evidence)
- United States v. Glover, 479 F.3d 611 (7th Cir.) (Rule 702 review standards)
- United States v. Richards, 719 F.3d 746 (7th Cir.) (standards for prosecutorial misconduct in closing)
- United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657 (7th Cir.) (prosecutorial comment review and deference to district court)
- United States v. Bell, 624 F.3d 803 (7th Cir.) (two-part test for reversible prosecutorial comment)
- United States v. Hale, 448 F.3d 971 (7th Cir.) (weight of evidence a key factor in harmless-error review)
- United States v. Lashmett, 965 F.2d 179 (7th Cir.) (broad reading of Rule 613(b) to admit extrinsic evidence)
- United States v. Wimberly, 60 F.3d 281 (7th Cir.) (harmless-error and impeachment principles)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (Supreme Court) (admissibility standard for expert testimony)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (Supreme Court) (applicability of Daubert to non-scientific experts)
- United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir.) (limits on lay witnesses drawing conclusions about intent)