2 F.4th 1043
7th Cir.2021Background
- In Aug. 2016 Jacob Wessel (felon) allegedly raised a gun at police; indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He has a long history of mental-health treatment and substance abuse.
- Defense repeatedly moved for competency hearings; the court ordered three 45-day evaluations and held three competency hearings over 2017–2019.
- Dr. Stephanie Callaway (defense-retained) repeatedly diagnosed schizoaffective disorder and concluded Wessel lacked the ability to assist in his defense.
- Drs. Judith Campbell and Allison Schenk (government examiners) each performed lengthy observations, diagnosed personality disorders and malingering, ruled out psychotic disorders, and opined Wessel was competent.
- The district judge credited the longer, more recent evaluations, found Wessel competent to stand trial (though she declined to accept his jury-waiver as not knowing/voluntary), and proceeded to trial after Wessel was removed from the courtroom for a profane outburst.
- Jury convicted Wessel; he appealed only the competency finding, arguing the court applied the wrong standard, relied on unreliable evidence, and ignored contrary evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Wessel's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Competency standard applied | Judge used a lower standard (Price) than Dusky | Judge quoted and applied the Dusky standard | No clear error; judge applied Dusky and review is for clear error |
| Reliance on government experts | Court improperly relied on Dr. Schenk (never spoke face-to-face) and Dr. Campbell | Experts each performed lengthy observations, ruled out psychosis, and found malingering/volitional behavior | No clear error in crediting government experts over defense expert |
| Jury-waiver inconsistency | If not competent to waive jury, then not competent for trial | Competency to stand trial and a knowing, voluntary jury waiver are distinct inquiries | Not inconsistent: waiver requires additional knowing/voluntary showing; judge permissibly denied waiver but found competency for trial |
| Weight of defense counsel’s observations | Counsel’s repeated, vigorous objections show incompetence | Court considered counsel’s views, ordered evaluations, and found experts’ evidence persuasive | Court adequately considered counsel and did not clearly err |
Key Cases Cited
- Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (establishes competency standard used: factual and rational understanding and ability to consult with counsel)
- Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) (a defendant lacking capacity to understand proceedings may not be tried)
- Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (trial cannot proceed if defendant incompetent)
- Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (competency standard for pleading or waiver is not higher than Dusky; waiver also requires knowing, voluntary choice)
- Price v. Thurmer, 637 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2011) (addressed in court’s discussion of competency phrasing)
- United States v. Collins, 949 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1991) (standard that competency findings reviewed for clear error)
- United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1990) (discusses Dusky standard in Seventh Circuit precedent)
- U.S. ex rel. Mireles v. Greer, 736 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1984) (counsel’s observations are valuable in competency inquiry)
- St. Pierre v. Cowan, 217 F.3d 939 (7th Cir. 2000) (distinguishes competency to waive from the separate knowing-and-voluntary waiver inquiry)
- Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965) (defendant does not have absolute right to waive jury trial)
