United States v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 946

Background

Jackson (25) met J.T. (15) in May 2014, took her on interstate trips to Atlanta, Louisville, and Grand Rapids, and placed ads on Backpage.com offering J.T. for paid sexual encounters.
Texts, call logs, hotel stays, and testimony showed J.T. engaged in commercial sex acts; Jackson used a prepaid phone to communicate with customers and kept part of the proceeds.
Police discovered a loaded handgun in Jackson’s car during the Grand Rapids stop; Jackson had an Indiana permit for the firearm.
Indictment charged Jackson with three counts under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (transporting a minor for sexual activity), three counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (sex trafficking of a minor), and one count under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence).
At trial both Jackson and J.T. testified; jury convicted on all counts. District court imposed sentencing enhancements for (1) being a manager/supervisor (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1) and (2) obstruction for Jackson’s testimony (U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1), and imposed a consecutive 60‑month § 924(c) term; total sentence 295 months.

Issues

Issue	Jackson’s Argument	Government’s Argument	Held
Whether § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague	§ 924(c)(3)(B) is void for vagueness under Johnson; residual clause cannot reliably determine which crimes involve substantial risk of use of force	§ 924(c)(3)(B) is distinguishable from ACCA’s residual clause (narrower language, no confusing enumerated list, temporally limited) and therefore not void	Vacated § 924(c) conviction: circuit precedent (Cardena, Vivas‑Ceja) controls; residual clause is unconstitutionally vague
Whether sex‑trafficking § 1591(a) qualifies as a § 924(c) "crime of violence" under the elements clause	§ 1591 does not have force as an element; Jackson relies on categorical approach to show elements clause inapplicable	Government conceded § 1591 lacks a force element	Agreed: § 1591 cannot qualify under § 924(c)(3)(A); question goes to the vagueness of (B)
Whether U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 (manager/supervisor) enhancement was properly applied	Jackson: victim J.T. cannot be a "participant," so § 3B1.1 does not apply; raising this on appeal (plain‑error)	Government conceded a minor trafficking victim cannot be a participant under the guideline	Vacated § 3B1.1 enhancement and remanded for resentencing without that adjustment
Whether U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (obstruction for perjury) was properly applied	Jackson: his testimony was mere denial of guilt, not perjury that warrants enhancement	Government: district court found Jackson lied about central issues (purpose of trips, knowledge of ads) and applied Dunnigan standard	Affirmed: district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and § 3C1.1 applies

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Vivas‑Ceja, 808 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2015) (concluding § 16(b)’s identical residual clause is unconstitutionally vague post‑Johnson)
United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause unconstitutionally vague)
Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding § 16(b) indeterminate; cert. granted)
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach to determining whether predicate offense qualifies as a crime of violence)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (explaining limits of categorical approach)
Dunnigan v. United States, 507 U.S. 87 (1993) (perjury at trial can support obstruction enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1)
United States v. Stenson, 741 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2014) (false trial testimony on material matters supports § 3C1.1)
United States v. Jarrett, 956 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1992) (victim of trafficking is not a "participant" for § 3B1.1 enhancement)
Ovalles v. United States, 861 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2017) (rejecting Cardena; upholding § 924(c)(3)(B))
United States v. Prickett, 839 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2016) (upholding § 924(c)(3)(B) as distinct from ACCA)
United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2016) (same)