United States v. Jackson, 30 F.4th 269

Devoris Jackson pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm; he was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) to the 15-year mandatory minimum.
The district court counted two Texas burglary-of-a-habitation convictions and a Texas aggravated robbery conviction as ACCA "violent felonies."
At the time Jackson possessed the gun (Aug. 2018), Fifth Circuit precedent (Herrold I) briefly held Texas burglary non-generic; the Supreme Court later resolved the circuit split in Quarles and Herrold I was vacated.
The Fifth Circuit, in Herrold II, then held Texas burglary of a habitation is generic burglary and therefore an ACCA predicate; Herrold II was controlling at Jackson’s sentencing.
Jackson argued applying the later precedent to enhance his sentence violated due process (Bouie retroactivity principle). He also argued his aggravated-robbery conviction could not qualify under ACCA’s elements clause because one statutory predicate allowed recklessness.
The court rejected Jackson’s Bouie claim and held the aggravated-robbery conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the elements clause using the divisibility/modified-categorical approach.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether applying intervening Supreme Court/Fifth Circuit precedent to treat Texas burglary of a habitation as an ACCA predicate violated due process under Bouie	Government: Applying Quarles/Herrold II was permissible; the change was not "unexpected and indefensible," and Bouie does not bar application of a Supreme Court decision resolving a circuit split	Jackson: Due process forbids retroactive application of a judicial interpretation that criminalizes conduct after the fact; Herrold II changed the law after his offense	Court: Rejected Jackson; Quarles/Herrold II were not unforeseeable or inconsistent with text/prior precedent, so no Bouie violation
Whether Jackson’s Texas aggravated-robbery conviction qualifies as an ACCA violent felony under the elements clause given Borden’s mens rea rule	Government: The record shows Jackson was convicted of robbery-by-threat (which requires intent/knowledge), and the statute is divisible so the modified-categorical approach identifies the qualifying predicate	Jackson: Aggravated robbery can be based on robbery-by-injury which permits recklessness, so the offense does not categorically require the required mens rea	Court: Affirmed; robbery statute is divisible, the charging documents show robbery-by-threat (qualifying mens rea), and aggravated robbery built on that predicate is a violent felony

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (defines "generic" burglary for ACCA)
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (due process/Bouie retroactivity limit on judicial change)
Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872 (Supreme Court resolved split about timing of intent for generic burglary)
United States v. Herrold, 941 F.3d 173 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (Herrold II holding Texas burglary is generic after Quarles)
Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (mens rea of recklessness insufficient for ACCA elements clause)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (modified categorical approach and divisibility analysis)
United States v. Garrett, 24 F.4th 485 (5th Cir.) (robbery statute is divisible; robbery-by-threat qualifies under ACCA)