United States v. Jackson
736 F.3d 953
10th Cir.2013Background
- On April 6, 2010, Jeremiah Jackson robbed a bank in Albuquerque, fled in a minivan, and crashed while pursued by police; two women in another car died and Jackson later confessed.
- Jackson was convicted by a jury of bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)) and two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) for killing persons while attempting to avoid apprehension. The district court vacated the § 2113(a) count as lesser-included and sentenced Jackson to two concurrent life terms under § 2113(e).
- Jackson appealed, arguing (1) multiplicity/double jeopardy because both deaths arose from a single incident and should be a single unit of prosecution, (2) prosecutorial comment on his silence warranted a mistrial, and (3) the court erred by not instructing the jury that § 2113(e) requires mens rea for the killings.
- The Tenth Circuit affirmed the convictions but held that sentencing on two § 2113(e) counts for deaths arising from a single robbery-related accident violated double jeopardy and remanded to vacate one of the sentences.
- The court rejected Jackson’s mistrial claim (prosecutor’s remarks addressed responsibility, not silence, and any prejudice was cured by instruction) and affirmed that § 2113(e) does not require a separate mens rea for the killing beyond the knowing commission of the underlying bank robbery (i.e., operates like felony-murder).
Issues
| Issue | Jackson's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Multiplicity / Double Jeopardy: Whether § 2113(e)’s "kills any person" permits multiple punishments for multiple victims arising from one robbery-related incident | Sentencing on two § 2113(e) counts for two deaths from a single accident violates double jeopardy; "any person" is ambiguous and should be read narrowly | § 2113(e) unambiguously punishes killing "any person," permitting separate punishments per victim; prior Tenth Circuit precedent supports multiple-victim sentencing | "Any person" is ambiguous; applying rule of lenity, § 2113(e) limited to one unit of prosecution for a single robbery-related accident — vacate one sentence on remand |
| Prosecutorial Comments on Silence: Whether government’s closing comments about Jackson "accepting responsibility" violated Griffin and required a mistrial | Comments impermissibly penalized Jackson’s decision not to testify; mistrial required | Comments targeted responsibility/culpability, not silence; any harm cured by instruction | No Fifth Amendment violation; denial of mistrial affirmed (remarks not treated as comment on silence; limiting instruction cured any prejudice) |
| Mens Rea: Whether § 2113(e) requires the government to prove a separate intent for the killing (i.e., intentional killing) | Court should instruct that killings must be intentional or at least require mens rea beyond the underlying robbery; otherwise statute becomes strict liability for accidental deaths | "Kills" in § 2113(e) applies to any homicide arising from the robbery; scienter is supplied by knowingly committing the underlying bank robbery (felony-murder-like) | No separate mens rea required for the killing; § 2113(e) punishes any killing in avoidance of apprehension tied to the knowing commission of the robbery; no intent instruction required |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955) (applied rule of lenity to ambiguous statutory phrase "any woman or girl" and limited unit of prosecution)
- Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958) (applied lenity to statute criminalizing interference with federal duties; limited punishment despite multiple victims)
- Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957) (declined to punish both entry-with-intent and consummated bank robbery under § 2113 as separate offenses when statute unclear)
- Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959) (applied lenity to prevent pyramiding of offenses under § 2113)
- United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1974) (vacated multiple § 2113(e)-based sentences for multiple victims; followed Bell/Ladner lenity analysis)
- United States v. Poindexter, 44 F.3d 406 (6th Cir. 1995) (held "kills" in § 2113(e) lacks separate mens rea and treats § 2113(e) akin to felony murder)