United States v. Jacinta Gussie
51 F.4th 535
3rd Cir.2022Background
- In 2016 a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Jacinta Gussie with fraud.
- In early 2017 the U.S. Attorney’s Office learned a grand juror who voted to indict may have been a victim of the charged scheme.
- Nearly a year later, the Government obtained a Superseding Indictment from a new grand jury; Gussie was later tried, convicted, and sentenced to 45 months’ imprisonment.
- On appeal Gussie argued (1) the original grand jury was tainted because a victim served on it, rendering the indictment invalid and requiring dismissal with prejudice, and (2) the Superseding Indictment was untimely because it was returned after the statute of limitations expired.
- The District Court treated any grand-jury error as subject to harmless-error review and denied dismissal; the Third Circuit affirmed, finding the Superseding Indictment cured any taint and the original indictment remained validly pending for statute-of-limitations purposes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a grand juror who was a potential victim so prejudiced the grand jury that the error was structural and required dismissal with prejudice | Gussie: the juror’s potential victim status so compromised the grand jury that the indictment must be dismissed as structural error | Gov’t: the error was discrete, not the sort of systemic intentional exclusion that creates structural error; any defect is subject to harmless-error review | The error was not structural; at most a due-process violation subject to harmless-error review, and the Superseding Indictment cured any prejudice |
| Whether the Superseding Indictment was barred by the statute of limitations because the Original Indictment was invalid | Gussie: the tainted original indictment was invalid, so it could not toll the statute of limitations for a later superseding indictment | Gov’t: an original indictment remains validly pending for limitations purposes even if flawed; the Superseding Indictment did not broaden charges | The original indictment was validly pending; the Superseding Indictment was timely because it did not materially broaden the charges |
| Whether prosecutorial misconduct or Rule 6 violations (delay in disclosure, grand-jury management) require dismissal | Gussie: Government’s delay and management failures show misconduct warranting dismissal | Gov’t: conduct, while sloppy, did not produce demonstrable prejudice and dismissal is an extreme remedy | Dismissal unwarranted; conduct was negligent at worst and any Rule 6 claim would be subject to harmless-error review |
Key Cases Cited
- Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (distinguishes structural errors from trial errors)
- Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988) (harmless-error standard for grand-jury violations)
- United States v. Friedman, 649 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1981) (original indictment can keep limitations tolled even if flawed)
- United States v. Alexander, 985 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 2021) (companion Third Circuit opinion addressing similar grand-jury issue)
- Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (definition of structural defects in grand-jury context)
- Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (structural error where race-based exclusion of jurors was shown)