United States v. J. Patrick Brester, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 8312

Brester and three co-conspirators (Landsman, Unger, Chadwick) ran a mortgage-fraud scheme charging bogus "management fees" on rapid resale apartment transactions; nine units went to foreclosure.
Landsman, Unger, and Chadwick pleaded guilty to conspiracy and agreed to cooperate; their plea agreements limited the loss amount to fraudulent transactions identified at plea time.
The government provided Brester copies of the co-conspirators’ plea agreements but did not affirmatively disclose the agreement to limit those co-conspirators’ loss amounts.
The government offered Brester a plea with the same limited loss amount; he rejected it and was tried.
At trial the three co-conspirators testified and were cross-examined about incentives in their plea deals; a jury convicted Brester on conspiracy and three wire-fraud counts (acquitting on six others).
At sentencing the government sought a larger loss amount based on later-discovered transactions and revealed the earlier undisclosed limitation on the co-conspirators’ loss amounts; Brester moved for dismissal or a new trial claiming Brady/Giglio violations, which the district court denied; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the court of appeals has jurisdiction to review denial of Brester's post-appeal motion for a new trial	Brester argued the denial should be reviewable despite no separate notice of appeal	Government relied on Rule 3(c) and Smith v. Barry to argue notice requirements are jurisdictional	Court exercised jurisdiction under circuit precedent (Wilson/Burns) because government was not prejudiced by lack of separate appeal notice
Whether nondisclosure of the co-conspirators’ agreement to limit loss amount violated Brady/Giglio and prejudiced Brester	Brester argued the undisclosed promise was favorable impeachment evidence that would have undermined confidence in the verdict	Government argued the information was cumulative of impeachment evidence already disclosed (plea deals, incentives, restitution allocation) and would not have changed the outcome	No Brady violation requiring reversal: the undisclosed evidence was cumulative and Brester failed to show a reasonable probability of a different result

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose favorable, material evidence)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (prosecutor must disclose deals that could impeach witness credibility)
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (Brady review requires showing suppression of favorable evidence and prejudice)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (prejudice standard: reasonable probability that result would differ)
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (mere possibility of helpful evidence insufficient to show prejudice)
United States v. Wilson, 894 F.2d 1245 (11th Cir. 1990) (circuit precedent permitting review of post-appeal motions where government not prejudiced)
United States v. Burns, 668 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1982) (precedent on reviewing post-appeal motions)
Aldridge v. Dugger, 925 F.2d 1320 (11th Cir. 1991) (failure to disclose merely cumulative impeachment evidence does not establish prejudice)