United States v. Israel Caceres-Olla
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 25556
| 9th Cir. | 2013Background
- Defendant Israel Amoldo Caceres-Olla pleaded guilty to unlawful reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326; base offense level is 8 under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a).
- Presentence report applied a +16 level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), treating a prior Florida conviction for lewd or lascivious battery (Fla. Stat. § 800.04(4)(a)) as a "crime of violence."
- Florida § 800.04(4)(a) criminalizes sexual activity with persons aged 12–15 (strict liability as to consent); the statute does not require nonconsent or an age-difference element.
- The government argued the conviction qualifies as a "forcible sex offense" (consent not given or not legally valid) or as "statutory rape" under Guideline § 2L1.2 comment n.1(B)(iii).
- The district court adopted the enhancement and sentenced Caceres-Olla to 46 months; he appealed. The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo and remanded for resentencing, vacating the enhancement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Caceres-Olla) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fla. § 800.04(4)(a) is a "forcible sex offense" under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 (consent not given or not legally valid) | The statute treats consent as legally invalid (consent is not a defense), so convictions are categorically "forcible sex offenses." | The statute is strict liability for age; it does not require lack of actual consent or coercion, so it is not categorically a forcible sex offense. | Held: Not a forcible sex offense; lack of consent as a separate element does not exist and the parenthetical describing invalid consent targets coerced/involuntary/incapacitated scenarios, not age-based strict liability. |
| Whether Fla. § 800.04(4)(a) is "statutory rape" under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 (generic definition) | Government alternatively urged it qualifies as statutory rape. | Caceres-Olla argued statute lacks the required age-difference element. | Held: Not statutory rape categorically because the generic federal definition requires an age-difference of at least four years; § 800.04(4) lacks that element. |
| Whether the statute is divisible on consent for application of the modified categorical approach | Government implied consent-related subdivisions could be used. | Caceres-Olla argued statute is not divisible on consent. | Held: Not divisible with respect to consent; modified categorical approach inapplicable. |
| Remedy for sentencing error | Government offered judicially noticeable facts and conceded no further evidence | Caceres-Olla sought vacatur of enhancement/resentencing | Held: Vacated enhancement and remanded for resentencing on the existing record (government conceded it had no more evidence). |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (established categorical approach for comparing statutory elements to generic offense definitions)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (statute broader than generic crime precludes using conviction as predicate; limits on modified categorical approach)
- United States v. Gomez, 732 F.3d 971 (9th Cir.) (generic statutory-rape definition includes at least a four-year age difference)
- United States v. Espinoza-Morales, 621 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir.) (discussion of 2008 Guidelines amendment clarifying "forcible sex offenses")
- United States v. Gomez-Mendez, 486 F.3d 599 (9th Cir.) (statutory rape treated as strict liability in many jurisdictions)
- United States v. Rangel-Castaneda, 709 F.3d 373 (4th Cir.) (construed the Guidelines to distinguish forcible sex offenses from statutory rape based on compulsion vs. age)
- Valencia-Barragan v. Gonzales, 608 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir.) (applying categorical approach and discussing minors' capacity to consent)
- Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. en banc) (defining sexual-abuse-of-minor categories and age-related elements)