United States v. Irizarry-Colon
848 F.3d 61
1st Cir.2017Background
- Efrén Irizarry-Colón participated in a conspiracy to defraud the Farm Service Agency (FSA) after Hurricane Georges (1998–2000); he later pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count while reserving an appeal on denial of a motion to dismiss the fourth indictment.
- Irizarry was indicted four times (2005, 2007, 2010, 2011). The first three indictments were dismissed under Rule 48(b) for Speedy Trial Act violations; the district court dismissed each without prejudice and Irizarry did not appeal those dismissals.
- The third indictment was dismissed after the court concluded 90 nonexcludable days had run; the clerk’s form judgment referenced a government Rule 48(a) dismissal, but the record showed Irizarry had moved to dismiss and asked for dismissal with prejudice.
- The government reindicted (fourth indictment, June 17, 2011). Irizarry moved to dismiss the fourth indictment under the Speedy Trial Act and under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; the district court denied the motion and Irizarry entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed that denial.
- The First Circuit affirmed the Speedy Trial Act ruling, vacated and remanded the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial ruling for reconsideration because the district court applied erroneous dicta from Colombo instead of controlling Supreme Court precedent (Loud Hawk), and rejected the Due Process (pre-indictment delay) claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the fourth indictment violated the Speedy Trial Act | Irizarry: cumulative time across indictments meant the fourth was time-barred | Gov't: third dismissal reset the statutory clock because it was on defendant’s motion | Court: Affirmed district court — third dismissal treated as defendant-initiated; clock reset; fourth indictment timely |
| Whether the third dismissal was a government or defendant dismissal (effect on statutory reset) | Irizarry: record shows dismissal effectively at government’s behest, so clock should not reset | Gov't: dismissal resulted from defendant’s motion and therefore resets clock | Held: dismissal was on defendant’s motion (record shows defendant sought dismissal and only prejudice issue was contested); clock reset |
| Sixth Amendment speedy-trial: how to measure length of delay | Irizarry: measure delay across all indictments (from first indictment through fourth) | Gov't & district court: measure only delay after the fourth indictment | Held: Vacated district court decision and remanded — court must measure delay from the first indictment per Loud Hawk and apply all four Barker factors (length, reason, assertion, prejudice) |
| Fifth Amendment (pre-indictment) due process claim | Irizarry: pre-indictment delay (between misconduct and first indictment) prejudiced his defense and was intentional/tactical | Gov't: delay was investigatory and not in bad faith; Irizarry failed to show substantial prejudice | Held: Rejected — Irizarry failed to show substantial prejudice or bad-faith tactical delay |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four-factor test for Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claims)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (delay must be presumptively prejudicial to trigger full Barker inquiry)
- United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986) (measure length-of-delay factor from initial indictment through dismissal/trial)
- United States v. Colombo, 852 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1988) (dicta regarding measuring delay; court declined to follow that dicta here)
- United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (1981) (speedy-trial guarantee not applicable between dropped charges and subsequent indictment)
- Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196 (2010) (clarified exclusions under the Speedy Trial Act)
- United States v. Myers, 666 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2012) (discussion of when dismissal by defendant vs. government affects statutory clock)