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700 F.Supp.3d 1
D. Mass.
2023
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Background

  • Iannelli was hired in 2018 as a bookkeeper/office manager and had authority to use her employer’s (subsidiary’s) parent-corporation signature stamp and access its Bank of America account.
  • The indictment alleges a two-part theft scheme: (1) ~43 inflated invoices totaling ~$30,000 by miscomputing hours/amounts and adjusting the accounting system; (2) issuance of unauthorized duplicate checks (about $150,000 total) by writing herself an extra $2,320 check each pay period and recording them as vendor payments.
  • Count V charges one such unauthorized check as bank fraud; Count VIII charges aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) based on use of the parent-corporation signature stamp on that extra check.
  • Iannelli moved to dismiss Count VIII arguing (a) under United States v. Dubin, the signature-stamp use was ancillary to routine bookkeeping/overbilling and not “at the crux” of the fraud, and (b) § 1028A(a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied.
  • The government argued the stamp was essential to the fraud because it impersonated the parent corporation and misrepresented who authorized payment.
  • The court denied the motion: it found the stamp use went to “who” authorized the withdrawal (thus at the crux of the bank fraud) and rejected the vagueness challenge as-applied.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether use of employer’s signature stamp is a “use” of another’s identification “during and in relation to” a predicate offense under § 1028A after United States v. Dubin Stamp use was at the crux: it misrepresented that the parent authorized the payment and made the check valid against the parent Stamp use was ancillary/garden‑variety overbilling; she was generally authorized to use the stamp, so identity was not misrepresented Denied dismissal: stamp use was at the crux because it deceived who authorized the check (unlike facts in Dubin)
Whether § 1028A(a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied The statute clearly proscribes using another’s identifier to procure funds without authority; the indictment gives clear notice Statute is vague and could criminalize routine overbilling or ordinary bookkeeping errors Denied: as‑applied not vague; a professional bookkeeper had clear notice that using the parent’s stamp to procure unauthorized funds was unlawful

Key Cases Cited

  • United States v. Dubin, 599 U.S. 110 (2023) (interpreting “use … during and in relation to” in § 1028A and requiring the identifier be at the crux of the fraud)
  • Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (void‑for‑vagueness challenges are considered as‑applied when conduct clearly proscribed)
  • Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (standard for vagueness review)
  • United States v. Bohai Trading Co., Inc., 45 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 1995) (indictment allegations are presumed true on a motion to dismiss)
  • Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952) (on standards for testing sufficiency of indictments)
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Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Iannelli
Court Name: District Court, D. Massachusetts
Date Published: Oct 31, 2023
Citations: 700 F.Supp.3d 1; 1:22-cr-10069
Docket Number: 1:22-cr-10069
Court Abbreviation: D. Mass.
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