United States v. Hukill
2017 CAAF LEXIS 305
| C.A.A.F. | 2017Background
- Specialist Christopher Hukill was convicted at a general court-martial (military judge alone) of rape and abusive sexual contact; sentenced to a dishonorable discharge, 7 years confinement, total forfeitures, and reduction to E-1.
- Two victims (AB and HG), friends of Hukill’s then-fiancée, alleged separate sexual assaults weeks apart; Hukill denied both; the fiancée testified Hukill admitted being unfaithful.
- The Government moved to admit each charged sexual offense as propensity evidence for the other under Military Rule of Evidence 413; the military judge granted the motion over defense objection.
- Trial counsel repeatedly argued the two charged incidents corroborated each other under M.R.E. 413; the judge indicated he would give limiting instructions but ultimately tried the case alone (so no members instructions were given).
- On appeal the Army Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, treating any error as harmless because a military judge is presumed to know and follow the law; the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) granted review.
- CAAF clarified that Hills applies to military judge-alone trials, held that using charged misconduct as M.R.E. 413 propensity evidence is error, and found the error prejudicial here; it reversed and authorized a rehearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hukill) | Defendant's Argument (United States) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hills’ rule barring use of charged misconduct under M.R.E. 413 applies to military judge-alone trials | Hills should apply equally to judge-alone trials; the Benchbook was mistaken and the military judge erred | Hills was wrongly decided or, in any event, is not a per se prohibition and does not implicate the same instructional errors in judge-alone trials | CAAF: Hills applies to judge-alone trials; charged, contested offenses cannot be used as M.R.E. 413 propensity evidence for other charged offenses |
| Whether the erroneous admission of charged-offense propensity evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Error was not harmless given the benchbook guidance, the judge’s strong 403 finding about propensity, and the Government’s reliance on the two incidents and alleged admission | The error was harmless because military judges are presumed to know and follow the law and there is no evidence the judge improperly relied on M.R.E. 413 | CAAF: Error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; constitutional dimensions require Chapman standard and the Government failed to show no reasonable possibility the error contributed to the verdict |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Hills, 75 M.J. 350 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (held charged misconduct cannot be used as M.R.E. 413 propensity evidence for other charged offenses)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967) (established harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for constitutional error)
- United States v. Moran, 65 M.J. 178 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (discussed "reasonable possibility" prejudice standard)
- United States v. Erickson, 65 M.J. 221 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (recognition of presumption that military judges know and follow the law)
- United States v. Kreutzer, 61 M.J. 293 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (application of harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt analysis)
- United States v. Mason, 45 M.J. 483 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (presumption that military judges know and follow the law)