984 F.3d 814
9th Cir.2020Background:
- Dixon, on federal supervised release with a warrantless, suspicionless search condition, was surveilled by SFPD and observed entering/exiting Oakdale Apartments and driving a blue Honda minivan.
- Officers detained Dixon; he dropped two garbage bags and a set of keys. Officers used those keys to enter an apartment and found drugs (apartment search later suppressed for lack of probable cause that he lived there).
- Officer Ochoa inserted one of the dropped keys into the blue minivan’s door lock and, upon gaining entry, found a large bag of marijuana in the trunk; additional drugs were recovered later at the station.
- The district court suppressed the apartment evidence, upheld the minivan search under United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, and declined to suppress the stationhouse seizure as attenuated; at trial Dixon was convicted of simple possession and sentenced to 21 months.
- On appeal the Ninth Circuit held that inserting a key into the vehicle lock is a Fourth Amendment search under the trespassory test from United States v. Jones, required probable cause to search a vehicle under a supervised-release condition, vacated the suppression ruling, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing; it also found the district court erred in categorically denying an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction.
Issues:
| Issue | Dixon's Argument | United States' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether inserting a key into a car lock is a Fourth Amendment search | Insertion was a search that required Fourth Amendment protection | Not a search under Ninth Circuit precedent (Currency); minimally intrusive identification conduct | It is a search: physical intrusion to obtain information violates the Fourth Amendment under Jones/Jardines |
| Whether a search of a vehicle under a supervised-release search condition is reasonable and what suspicion level is required | Even with diminished privacy, officers lacked probable cause that Dixon owned/controlled the van; search unreasonable | Supervised-release status greatly diminishes privacy; only reasonable suspicion needed to subject vehicle to the condition | Officers must have probable cause to believe the supervisee owns or controls the vehicle before searching it under the release condition |
| Whether probable cause existed here that Dixon controlled the minivan | Facts are disputed (identity of van, which van was tested, whether Dixon approached the van), so probable cause is not established on this record | Key fit and subsequent discovery supported probable cause; district court relied on undisputed key-fit fact | Record is unclear on probable cause; case remanded for an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes |
| Whether denial of a two-level acceptance-of-responsibility reduction at sentencing was proper | Dixon admitted possession (the offense of conviction) and thus was eligible for the reduction | District court found Dixon did not accept responsibility for the greater charged offense and denied reduction | District court erred by categorically denying the reduction; remand required to make factual finding if conviction is reinstated |
Key Cases Cited
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (established the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test)
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (reaffirmed trespass-based Fourth Amendment protection and held physical intrusion to obtain information is a search)
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (applied trespass theory to curtilage/home investigations)
- United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2000) (prior Ninth Circuit holding that inserting a key to identify ownership was not a search)
- Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (diminished privacy expectations for individuals on supervised release/parole)
- Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. en banc) (requirement of probable cause that parolee resides in a house before searching it under parole condition)
- United States v. Bolivar, 670 F.3d 1091 (discussing suspicion standards for items within a residence versus the initial determination that the residence is subject to a search condition)